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In December 2003, the French government decided to implement an ambitious transport 
programme with 35 major road and rail infrastructure projects, representing an overall investment 
of €20 billion between 2005 and 2012. In order to finance part of this programme a new funding 
agency with an independent budget, known as AFITF ("Agence pour le Financement des 
Infrastructures de Transport de France") was created on the 1
st January 2005. Initially AFITF was 
expected to provide €7.5 billion of the €20 billion required for the programme with a borrowing 
capacity on the capital market based on revenues from paid-off State-owned toll motorway 
companies. However this revenue source might be threatened by the ongoing privatisation of 
motorway companies. The remaining financing needs (€12.5 billion) were expected to be met by 
external partners (local governments, European Union, private sector with public-private 
partnerships). 
 
AFITF is the fourth transport investment fund to be created in France since 1995. The first, the 
FITTVN (“Fonds d'Investissement pour les Transports Terrestres et les Voies Navigables”) was 
created in 1995 to re-launch public investment in transport infrastructure but was abolished in 2001. 
Two other funds were created in 2002 to develop intermodal transport in France and the Alpine 
region. However, these two funds never had a real existence. 
 
The first part of the case study is devoted to the investment funds feasibility question through the 
FITTVN example. 
 
When it was created, the FITTVN symbolised a new policy trend aimed at promoting regional 
development and intermodal transport. Funded from specific taxes, it was intended to be 
independent from the general budget and get around the budget constraint issue. The fund was 
financed by the “taxe d’aménagement du territoire” which was expected to provide a permanent 
source of finance. The fund has financed several major transport links, including motorways, the 
Mediterranean TGV line and some stretches of inland waterways.  
 
Initially the fund had several advantages: it was launched by a political leader, with the support of 
elected representatives (the Senate), grounded in the roots of the electoral system, and based on a 
“cash cow” revenue source (motorway users who have no real capacity to organise themselves as a 
structured interest group). However, the FITTVN had several weaknesses: firstly the regional 
development and intermodality objectives were not clearly defined; secondly, as a consequence of 
this imprecision as regards objectives, faced with an overall public budget constraint a kind of 
“communicating vessels” operation naturally occurred by which the fund replaced the general 
budget of central government instead of providing new financing capacity. 
 
These weaknesses were exploited by several interest groups and the fund was abolished in 2001 
while the motorway tax was maintained. The main conclusions from this experience are as follows: 
there is a need for a clear definition of the objectives and scope of this kind of fund and a strong 
legislative and institutional basis in order to resist pressures, be they political or financial; sound 
initial design and functional operation are required in order to manage the interest groups and avoid 
the formation of excessively powerful opposition coalitions: this means addressing not only 
legislative aspects but also efficiency and equity; the conditions of euro-compatibility for this kind 
of fund must be defined i.e. pricing rules and revenue use (which part of user revenue can be 
allocated to finance which modes). 
 
This succession of investment funds underlines the persistent need for permanent (or “sustainable”) 
financing of transport investment with the aim of opening up less developed areas.  REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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The second part of the case study addresses a number of issues related to cross-financing as an 
alternative to public subsidies and pricing rules as a revenue source and demand management tool. 
It assesses the efficiency of a multi-modal transport fund financed mainly by toll motorway users. 
Cross-financing from existing motorways to new motorway or rail projects as an alternative to 
direct public subsidies is evaluated. Issues of pricing efficiency in connection with cross-financing 
are also addressed.  
 
In the following assessment the investment programme is not questioned: this means that the use of 
money for purposes other than transport infrastructure is not discussed. Only alternative ways of 
financing this programme and the pricing of transport infrastructure are considered. 
 
This evaluation is based on two studies. The first involves the financing and pricing of a programme 
of ten new motorway projects. The second study involves the cross-financing of the Lyon-Turin rail 
link from Alpine motorways.  
 
The first study has assessed regulation schemes on a programme of 10 new motorway projects 
distributed in the French metropolitan territory.  
 
The first rationale is to address the issue of optimal financing with the three schemes below: in the 
first scheme the current pricing and revenue use scheme is applied to the new motorway projects. 
The second scheme introduces cross-financing and add a funding completed by public subsidies if 
necessary. The third scheme adds mark-ups to tolls planned for the new motorway projects in order 
to reduce the need for public subsidies from this new projects. 
 
Alternative schemes  Pricing  Revenue use 
Planned tolling scheme 
+ public subsidies 
Tolling scheme as 
originally planned for the 
new projects 
Revenues from road tolls on each new motorway 
go to the motorway concessionaire.  
 
Additional public subsidies to cover new 
motorway construction costs. 
Planned tolling scheme 
+ transport fund + 
public subsidies 
Tolling scheme as 
originally planned for the 
new projects 
Revenues from road tolls on each new motorway 
go to the motorway concessionaire.  
 
Tax on existing toll motorways goes to the 
transport fund. The transport fund subsidises new 
motorways.  
 
Additional public subsidies when needed. 
Optimised tolls + 
transport fund + public 
subsidies 
Optimised tolls (only on 
new projects) 
As above 
Overview of financing schemes 
 
The second rationale is to address the issue of optimal pricing comparing a pure short-run marginal 
cost pricing (SMCP) with tolls originally planned for the new projects. This SMCP is applied 
simultaneously on (planned) motorways and on their competing existing (currently free) highways. 
Central (fuel) taxes are suppressed. 
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Alternative schemes  Pricing  Revenue use 
Planned tolling scheme  Tolling scheme as 
originally planned for the 
new projects 
Revenues from road tolls on each new 
motorway go to the motorway concessionaire. 
 
No public subsidies 
Pure SMCP  SMCP pricing on new 
motorway projects and their 
free highway alternatives 
No transport fund. No public subsidies. 
Overview of pricing schemes 
 
The third rationale is to combine an optimal financing with an optimal pricing. This scheme is 
compared to the reference one combining tolls originally planned for the new projects and a 
financing with public subsidies. 
 
Alternative schemes  Pricing  Revenue use 
Planned tolling scheme 
+ public subsidies 
Tolling scheme as 
originally planned for the 
new projects 
Revenues from road tolls on each new 
motorway go to the motorway 
concessionaire.  
 
Public subsidies when needed. 
Pure SMCP + transport 
fund + public subsidies 
SMCP pricing on the new 
motorway projects and their 
free highway alternatives 
Tax on existing toll motorways go to the 
transport fund. Transport fund subsidises the 
new motorways. 
 
Public subsidies when needed. 
Overview of pricing and cross-financing schemes 
 
The Molino model is used in a “two roads, passenger/freight” configuration and compares a new 
project, i.e. a new tolled motorway, with a locally existing competing alternative, i.e. a parallel 
highway (not tolled except for the existing tolled A1 alternative to A24). Given the location of these 
projects it is assumed that network effects on demand between the new projects are negligible. Thus 
each project is assessed in this Molino configuration, independently of the others. The only 
interaction is a financial one, by the means of public or fund subsidies. 
 
The performance of regulation schemes can differ widely across the projects evaluated. It is obvious 
that the specific framework of each project, above all its construction cost and the competitiveness 
of its alternative, determines the conditions of its regulation. 
 
The results yield a conclusion in three points regarding the motorway programme. 
 
The first lesson from this motorway programme analysis relates to the financing issue. When 
compared with public subsidies from the general budget, cross-financing from existing motorways 
to new motorways slightly increases the level of welfare for all the projects (except for one project 
where the level of welfare is more than doubled). This overall result is a consequence of the fact 
that public subsidies bear a levy cost in the economy (i.e. the Marginal Cost of Public Funds) while 
a lower levy cost is associated with subsidies from a transport fund (when revenues come from a 
mark-up on tolls as in our study). Moreover the sensitivity of welfare improvement depends directly 
on the level of the Marginal Cost of Public Funds. Note that, because of this difference in levy cost, 
this only shows the advantage of direct earmarking of additional taxes on tolls, whether transiting 
through a transport fund or not, compared to public subsidies coming from the general levy of 
public money. 
 
Secondly, with regard to optimal pricing, SMCP permits a slight increase in overall welfare when 
compared with the planned tolling scheme, despite the low forecast level of congestion on the REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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studied projects. This can mainly be explained by the fact that road traffic will increase since the 
overall costs borne by the road users would be reduced by 65% when switching from fuel taxes plus 
planned tolls to SMCP. However because of the low level of congestion, pure SMCP cannot solve 
financing problems. It must be supplemented by subsidies from a transport fund or from central (or 
local) governments. This does not mean that new investments are not justified. Indeed, motorway 
projects are planned mainly not to reduce congestion but to improve the quality and safety of road 
transport. This improvement and especially the expected time savings induce a socio-economic rate 
of return high enough to motivate the interest of the community to achieve these projects. 
 
Therefore, while pure SMCP is more efficient as regards pricing (without considering financing 
problems) and cross-financing appears to be more efficient as a means of financing new motorway 
projects, the combination of the two rules would increase overall welfare. Indeed for all projects the 
scheme that combines pure SMCP with cross-financing provides the greatest increase in overall 
welfare of all the alternative schemes. 
 
The assessment of rail projects is made through the Lyon-Turin rail link due to its importance, the 
ease to identify a parallel road competing option and data availability. 
 
The assessment focuses on the cross-financing of new rail infrastructures by road revenues with five 
different pricing and financing schemes summarised below. A specific transport fund is considered 
here which is slightly different from that described in the previous section: this is a kind of “Alpine 
fund” where only the two Alpine motorway crossings (Mont-Blanc and Fréjus) which compete with 
the Lyon-Turin rail link would be a possible source of cross-financing. 
 
Concerning the rail-road study, the assessment of the Lyon-Turin rail project shows the limited 
impact on welfare of cross-financing rail by road by the means of toll mark-ups on alternative 
Alpine motorways. However there would be a higher redistribution toward low income passengers 
compared with high income ones and the financial balances of the rail operator and manager would 
be improved while the rail mode share would increase.  
 
It should be stressed that while public subsidies amount to 88% of the construction costs in the first 
scheme (no cross-financing) this level of public subsidies decreases by 14% and 24% with cross-
financing by motorway toll mark-ups of respectively 25% and 80%.  
 
The introduction of the same national transport fund as in the road case study would yield some 
advantage when combined with the alpine fund supplied by toll mark-ups, by achieving the 
complete coverage of the subsidy need while keeping the improvement of the financial balances of 
the rail operator and manager and of the rail mode share. 
 REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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Alternative pricing and 
funding schemes 
Pricing Revenue  use 
Current motorway tolling 
scheme + public subsidies 
Current tolling scheme 
on alpine motorways 
Rail revenues go to rail operator or 
manager.  
 
Toll revenues go to motorway operator. 
 
Public subsidies for the rail link. 
 
No cross-financing. 
Increase in alpine motorway 
tolls by 25% + transport 
fund + public subsidies 
Mark-ups (25%) on 
current tolling scheme 
on alpine motorways 
Rail revenues go to rail operator or 
manager.  
 
“Base” toll revenues go to motorway 
operator. Additional surplus of alpine 
motorways goes to the Alpine fund which 
subsidises the rail link. 
 
Public subsidies when needed. 
Increase in alpine motorway 
tolls by 80% + transport 
fund + public subsidies 
Mark-ups (80%) on 
current tolling scheme 
on alpine motorways 
As above. 
Current motorway tolling 
scheme + transport fund 
Current tolling scheme 
on alpine motorways. 
 
Tax on existing toll motorway (whole 
national network) goes to the transport 
fund. The transport fund subsidises the rail 
link.  
 
Rail revenues go to rail operator or 
manager. 
Increase in alpine motorway 
tolls by 25% + transport 
fund 
Mark-ups (25%) on 
current tolling scheme 
on alpine motorways 
Tax on existing toll motorway (whole 
national network) goes to the transport 
fund. The transport fund subsidises the rail 
link.  
 
Additional surplus of alpine motorways 
goes to the Alpine fund which subsidises 
the rail link. 
 
Rail revenues go to rail operator or 
manager. 
Overview of alternative pricing and financing schemes for the Lyon-Turin rail link 
 
 
Moreover, the revenues from road toll mark-ups only consider traffic crossing the Franco-Italian 
border through the Mont-Blanc and Fréjus tunnels. The toll mark-up base could be widened to all 
traffic using the Alpine motorway network, on the premise that this traffic would benefit from lower 
road congestion resulting from modal transfer to rail: this would yield much higher revenues. 
However this option raises policy and equity issues which require more thorough analysis. REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 




In December 2003, the French government decided to implement an ambitious transport 
programme with 35 major road and rail infrastructure projects, representing an overall investment 
of €20 billion between 2005 and 2012. In order to finance part of this programme a new funding 
agency with an independent budget, known as AFITF ("Agence pour le Financement des 
Infrastructures de Transport de France") was created on the 1
st January 2005. Initially AFITF was 
expected to provide €7.5 billion of the €20 billion required for the programme with a borrowing 
capacity on the capital market based on revenues from paid-off State-owned toll motorway 
companies. However this revenue source might be threatened by the ongoing privatisation of 
motorway companies. The remaining financing needs (€12.5 billion) were expected to be met by 
external partners (local governments, European Union, private sector with public-private 
partnerships). 
 
AFITF is the fourth transport investment fund to be created in France since 1995. The first, the 
FITTVN (“Fonds d'Investissement pour les Transports Terrestres et les Voies Navigables”) was 
created in 1995 to re-launch public investment in transport infrastructure but was abolished in 2001. 
Two other funds were created in 2002 to develop intermodal transport in France and the Alpine 
region. However, these two funds never had a real existence. 
 
This succession of investment funds underlines the persistent need for permanent (or “sustainable”) 
financing of transport investment with the aim of opening up less developed areas.  
 
We have a double approach to study French multi-modal transport funds. The first one will focus on 
acceptability through the analysis of FITTVN while the second will address efficiency and equity 
issues an evaluation based on two studies. The first study involves the financing and pricing of a 
programme of ten new motorway projects while the second considers involves the cross-financing 
of the Lyon-Turin rail link from Alpine motorways. 
 
This double approach can be summarised through criteria of assessment (see Table 1):  
 










Welfare indicators for categories of users (Molino model) 
Acceptability 
 
Exploitation of the overview of FITTVN and expert know how of the case 
study team to realise a qualitative analysis. 
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2. The investment funds feasibility question through the 
FITTVN example 
 
2.1  Methodology 
 
The feasibility of the FITTVN from the point of view of policy and acceptability is analysed using 
mainly parliamentary reports and Accounting Office reports. The question concerning the financing 
of transport investment is recurrent, often developed in annual “finance law projects” and Members 
of Parliament feel concerned by this issue. Moreover, we used information from Transport Ministry 
and European Commission. 
 
2.2  Overview of the FITTVN  
 
The FITTVN creation in 1995 symbolises the come back of transport investments funds to finance 
large-scale projects. If we take into account AFITF, three kinds of funds will follow the FITVVN 
between 1995 and 2005. FDIT and FDIPTMA were created in 2002 but had never really existed. So 
in this study we will focus on the FITVVN. 
 
The investments funds' implementation in the mid 90's correspond to an increasing need of 
financing in an economic crisis context. Faced with a debt and re-election constraint1, politicians 
considered investments funds as an interesting solution to implement their transport policy with 
large-scale projects implementation without rising public debt. Each actor or group of actors 
implied in FITTVN used this fund as a tool to favour its own interest and therefore to maximise its 
discretionary power.  
 
The main questions to be addressed concerning the FITTVN, and its actors involve, are about its 
functioning, its features, its weakness…What were the reasons leading to the creation of the 
FITTVN? Who favoured its implementation? Why did FITTVN disappear after only 5 years? In 
this overview it will be shown how some actors doomed the ambitious FITTVN's to failure. 
 
FITTVN was created in February 1995 by the "Pasqua2 Law" in favour of land development3 to 
implement new transport infrastructures. This law, at the request of Senators, symbolised the Right-
wing coming into the government. Senators are indeed elected by local representatives and 
therefore they feel more concerned by the inequalities reduction between regions. The "Pasqua 
Law" was the first one to introduce the idea of Land development since the decentralisation law in 
the 80's. The land development policy implemented in 1995 created the national scheme and 
regional schemes for land development. These schemes had many objectives, among them 
economic efficiency improvement, spatial and regional disparities reducing…They were based on 
principles like revenues sharing between poor and rich local authorities, "equality of opportunities"4 
for urban and rural areas inhabitants… 
 
                                                 
1 FITTVN was implemented in February 1995 by right-wing just before presidential election in May 1995. 
2 Pasqua was then Minister of the French Government. 
3 Art. 37 from law n°95-115 (Land development planning law), 1995 4
th February. 
4 Art. 1 from law n°95-115 (Land development planning law), 1995 4
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Therefore transportation infrastructures were central to the land development and guiding schemes 
corresponding to each transport mode separately (road, rail, inland waterways) were created. 
According to the land development law " there is not land development without transport 
infrastructures" and "in 2015 each part of the national territory will be at a short way (below 50 
kilometres) of a motorway or a high-speed rail link". Therefore it foresaw an equal development for 
each region with the financing of new land transport infrastructures. Indeed, this law was aimed at 
implementing free-roads to favour the development of enclosed areas. 
 
The "Pasqua law" had been revised in 1999 by the "Voynet law"5 which modified national and 
regional schemes for land development, strengthening the sustainable development policy. The 
"Voynet law"6 implemented 9 "collective services schemes" (schémas de services collectifs) to 
guarantee public utilities in less developed areas and to favour a sustainable development policy. 
Among them, a multimodal scheme for freight transport and another for passengers transport. These 
two multimodal transport schemes replaced mode-related schemes from the "Pasqua law", which 
were not at the top of the agenda. The main objective of the mutimodal services schemes, still 
applied, is to used the more appropriated mode to answer the needs of transport for the next 20 
years, taking into consideration the economic, social and environmental constraints. 
 
FITTVN which had allowed to finance a part of transport infrastructures in less developed areas 
was therefore considered as the symbol of a balanced land development. Beyond this symbolic 
aspect FITTVN can be seen as a tool to finance this policy.  
 
FITTVN was implemented in 1995 during an economic crisis period. The beginning of the nineties 
were characterised by a low economic growth and debt budgetary constraint due to Maastricht 
criteria. Therefore money became scarce for investments. General budget couldn't finance the Land 
development policy and the Ministry of Transport's budget was mainly allocated to functioning 
spending. A transport investment fund appeared as the best solution to implement this policy. It 
allowed to increase transport investments in an economic crisis context. FITTVN was all the more 
interesting for the government since it showed the ambitious transport policy of the government 
without increasing the Transport Ministry's budget. Indeed, FITTVN was independent of the State 
budget. It was a special account in public funds (account n°902-26), that meant total expenses could 
not be higher than available receipts. The revenues of the FITTVN came from motorways users and 
the firms producing hydroelectric power like "Compagnie Nationale du Rhône" or the public firm 
EDF7. They financed FITTVN with two taxes : 
 
•  Motorways users contributed to the financing with the "Land Development Tax" (LDT). This 
tax is collected by tolled motorway societies and paid by drivers using motorways (cars and 
HGV). Nowadays, this tax still exists. It adds up to € 0.007 per kilometre on motorways in 2000 
but is not very visible for users. We can notice the amount of the LDT had doubled between 
1995 and 1996 and went from € 0.003 per km to € 0.006. So, the Land Development Tax 
returned € 0.32 billion in 1996. The increase of the receipt generated by the LDT can be 
explained by the increase of the amount of the LDT in one hand. On the other hand, it can result 
of an increase of traffic in motorways due to the economic upsurge after the mid 90's. 
•  The other tax concerned public firms producing hydroelectric power, mainly EDF ("Electricité 
de France") and "Compagnie Nationale du Rhône". This tax was created to have inland 
waterways financed by firms which used waterpower electricity. EDF and "Compagnie 
Nationale du Rhône" had to pay the tax according to the level of their production. While the tax 
                                                 
5 Law n°99-533, June 1999. 
6 D. Voynet (Green Party) was minister of the Leftwing government. 
7 Motorways users and public firms producing hydroelectric power were considered as "milk cow" because they were 
interesting financing sources. REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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amounted to € 0.006/kw per hours in 1997, it added up to € 0.012 in 1998/kwh, owing to the 
abandoning of "canal Rhin-Rhône" project which could have been financed by EDF. It was a 
kind of user-pay policy but this tax has disappeared the 1
st January 2003.  
 
Between 1995 and 2000, receipts from the LDT and the tax on hydroelectric power production were 
constantly increasing and amounted to € 710 million in 2001. On the whole FITTVN had € 3 billion 
of allocation mainly supplied by the land development tax. As it is shown in next maps, this fund 
enabled to finance a part of the " Mediterranean TGV " implementation, to launch the "TGV Est" 
between Paris and Strasbourg in the best conditions, to modernise the rail network and to develop 
combined transport. FITTVN was used to implement free-road like motorways "A 20" and "A75" 
or national road "RN 7 extension" to open up the Massif Central area. It allowed to subsidise a part 
of the "Route Centre Europe Atlantique" (RCEA), the "Estuaires" motorway (West of France), and 
a part of navigable rivers restoration. In spite of these investments a problem arose : the 
implementation of FITTVN became incompatible with the spirit of Land development Law, on the 
one hand, and with European Union directives on the other hand. 
Figure 1: Projects financed by the FITTVN 
Mainly road and rail projects partly financed by the FITTVN
Origin : CIADT, december 2003 Origin : Transport Ministry
Legend :  Legend :
"TGV Est" project Centre Europe Atlantique Road
"Mediterranean TGV" implementation               A 75 motorway
A 20 motorway
National Road RN 7
Estuaires Motorway  REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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Figure 2: Resources of the FITTVN 

























2.3  A fund turned away from its first purpose 
 
As the years went by, FITTVN's functioning became inconsistent with its initial aim. It favoured 
land development with the implementation of new transport infrastructures, but to the detriment of 
Ministry of Transport's budget and European Commission rules. So the French multimodal fund 
was criticised both by the Accounting Office and the National Assembly. Only the Transport 
Ministry and the Senat, which had created the FITTVN, defended its role. In this part it will be 
explained why a lack of efficiency and a lack of conformity with European directives doomed 
FITTVN to failure.  
 
•  An inefficient functioning 
 
Most of critics on the FITTVN functioning concerned the lack of separation between the fund and 
the General Budget. This lack of specificity of the investment fund appeared in the characteristics of 
projects implemented owing to FITTVN and projects implemented by the General Budget, on the 
one hand. On the other hand the interdependence appeared in the financing scheme with the 
"communicating vessels" principle.  
 
The FITTVN was implemented to open up less developed areas and to favour intermodal 
transportation with fluvial, rail and road constructions. Nevertheless investments financed by 
FITTVN were the same as investments financed by the General Budget and the "land development" 
and "intermodal" dimensions of the investment fund had never really existed8. No "land 
development" and "intermodal" schemes were really planned at the FITTVN's creation. The "land 
development" and "intermodal" concepts were imprecise as it is shown in the "Pasqua law"9. 
Therefore the FITTVN's investment program had not enough specificity. For example, FITTVN 
had permitted to buy trains for regional transport or had contributed to finance the French 
Environment and Energy control Agency called ADEME with € 305 000 while it was not in its 
action field. Many projects financed by FITTVN had a credit line in the section "road and land 
transports" of the General Budget like free-road implementation in the Massif Central area. We can 
                                                 
8 IDIARD J.L., "Le FITTVN ne finance aucune politique spécifique". Projet de loi de finance pour 2000. 
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imagine that even if FITTVN had never been implemented these projects would have been realised. 
They would have been financed by the General Budget.  
 
The lack of separation between FITTVN and the State Budget appeared in the decrease of public 
infrastructures spending. Between 1996 and 2000, the amount of public infrastructures spending 
decreased from € million 1400. For successive governments, the interest of the FITTVN was mainly 
to reduce investments financed by the General Budget. Transferring projects implementation to 
FITTVN, the State reduced its own budget. This is the "communicating vessels" principle. 
 
Nevertheless, it can be noticed the amount of projects financed owing to the FITTVN increased of € 
million 434 between 1996 and 2000 while the amount of public infrastructures financed by the 
general budget decreased from € million 1400. Therefore, between 1996 and 2000, in spite of 
FITTVN infrastructures investments had decreased of € million 1000. This decrease may be 
explained by the necessary restriction of public spending due to Maastricht criteria on public debt10 
and FITTVN implementation may not the only reason of a decrease of State spending. Nevertheless 
this decrease is in opposition to the "Land Development law" from 1995. 
 
At the origin, FITTVN was a tool to increase transport investments but in reality it allowed the State 
to decrease its own spending. According to the Accounting Office, FITTVN generated confusion on 
the role of each source of financing. 
 
The second aspect of the crisis of efficiency concerned the economic context. FITTVN was 
implemented in 1995 during an economic crisis period. The Government was faced with a 
budgetary constraint. Nevertheless with an investment fund to finance transport infrastructures, the 
main part of the budgetary constraint disappeared and "additional resources" from LDT and 
hydroelectric tax can be used to implement high-scale projects. So what is paradoxical in the 
FITTVN, is that in spite of important revenues allocated to the FITTVN, only a part of them were 
used11. It can be explained by the fear of an increasing public debt. Indeed FITTVN partly financed 
projects but the other part had to be financed by the General Budget. Therefore the government was 
obliged to borrow in order to finance these new implementations. Due to Maastricht criterion on 
debt, governments had to limit their indebtedness. Sometimes government may have preferred no 
implement a project instead of running into debt.  
 
The efficiency crisis can be characterised by the "communicating vessels" problem about projects 
financing and by the economic situation. The crisis context limited the level of indebtedness and 
FITTVN's resources were not all used. Critics of Accounting Office and Parliament on the FITTVN 
efficiency were strengthen by the lack of conformity of the fund to European Union directives. 
 
•  FITTVN : a French exception ? 
 
The second reason explaining the end of FITTVN concerns the relation between the FITTVN's 
functioning and European Union directives. In a first point the European commission criticised 
taxation of motorway societies12 (with the LDT), especially because the State imposed the payment 
of the LDT by motorways companies before they had passed this tax on their tariffs. Moreover, for 
European Commission, an increasing toll can impact on motorway traffic, reducing motorway 
concessionaires revenues.  
 
                                                 
10 See explanation top of page 6. 
11 Between 1995 and 1999. 
12  Assemblée Nationale, Commission des finances, de l'économie générale et du plan, compte-rendu n°7, 13 octobre 
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In a second point European Union directives stipulated that revenues had to be re-allocated to the 
mode they came from13. FITTVN's revenues came from the motorways users with Land 
development tax (between 56% in 1999 and 73% in 1995) and the "inland waterways users" with 
the hydroelectric power production tax. So, referring to the European Commission FITTVN had to 
finance mainly road investments. But the FITTVN functioning underlined the non-discrimination 
issue between modes. Indeed the part of road investments in FITTVN's revenues is inferior or equal 
to 50%. Moreover, the more LDT is increasing, the less road investments are important. 
 
Figure 3: Allocation of FITTVN’s revenues 
Origin : Lois de finance initiale, Direction Générale de la comptabilité publique in Les Transport en 1999 and
Les Transport en 2000 (37
ème et 38
ème rapport de la Commission des comptes des transports de la nation)
























FITTVN was faced with a dilemma. Indeed, if it had followed European Union directives, it would 
have been into contradiction with its function of "intermodal fund" but if it had financed rail or 
inland waterways investments with road tolls, it wouldn't have respected European rules. As we can 
see in the previous scheme, in fact FITTVN had given € 228 million to road investments while its 
budget amounted to € 655 million. In 2000, only 35% of FITTVN's subventions were allocated to 
road network while the Land Development Tax had generated about 60% of FITTVN's revenues.  
 
Nevertheless since 2001 the European Commission had revised its position concerning transport 
investments funds. In the White Paper "European Transport Policy for 2010 : time to decide", the 
Commission proposed solutions based on a pooling of transport revenues " to open up the 
possibility of allocating part of the revenue from user charges to construction of the most 
environmentally-friendly infrastructure"14 in the same area.  
 
Referring to this part, we can notice the important role played by political leaders and institutions 
on the implementation and on the end of the FITVVN. It seems to be interesting to focus on the 
analysis of politico-economic interrelationships between actors involved in the FITTVN 
 
                                                 
13 "The revenue from tolls and user charges must be ploughed back into maintenance of the road infrastructure on 
which the tolls are levied and into the transport sector as a whole". Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 1999/62/EC on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures.  
14 White Paper : "European Transport Policy for 2010 : time to decide". 2001 REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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2.4  Actors involved in the FITTVN 
 
In this part we will review actors involved in FITTVN and their "attitude" toward this fund (viz. if 
they are in favour or opposed to FITTVN) before explaining how interrelationships between these 
actors and the political context doomed this fund to failure. This analysis can be seen as a tool to 
anticipate the relationships between actors involved in AFITF's. 
 
We can distinguish two groups of actors involved in FITTVN : political leaders and institutions or 
organisations. 
 
•  The main politician involved is Charles Pasqua. He was a main leader of the right-wing in the 
first half of nineties and created FITTVN in February 1995 while he was Home Secretary and 
Land Development Minister15. Beyond the political idea of spatial inequalities reductions, 
FITTVN was a tool for Pasqua to reinforce its bonds with the Senat in order to continue his 
political carrier at the Senat presidency. He tried to gain the Senators confidence. Implementing 
a new fund to finance transport infrastructures in less-developed areas, Pasqua had showed he 
felt concerned by rural regions. Pasqua was involved in FITTVN to reach his own main 
however in our study will be more focused on institutions. Therefore, the name of Pasqua won't 
appeared in the rest of the text.  
 
Main groups of actors are institutions or organisations :  
 
•  The Senat's members are elected by local representatives and they feel more concerned by the 
inequalities reduction between regions than other politicians. The Senat is more turned towards 
rural areas because of a French electoral specificity which lend more weight to rural areas 
representatives for the Senators election. Therefore Senators were interested by the Pasqua Law 
which defended less-developed areas. As politicians, Senators were under the re-election and 
the budget constraint. So, voting the Pasqua Law, first they developed their regions and so 
increased their chance of being re-elected and secondly they favoured the implementation of 
new transport infrastructures without increasing general taxes for most of their (direct and 
indirect) voters. The Pasqua Law was supported the more it allowed new transport 
infrastructures, viz. noticeable results. Indeed, politician are sensible on the "visible aspect" of 
results. As it is said by Weck-Hannemann16 in 1999 "benefits are preferred to be noticeable and 
costs should be as invisible as possible". Pasqua and the Senat's members had not the same 
purpose (to attain to the Senat's presidency for Pasqua and to be re-elected for the Senators) but 
the means to reach their aim were the same. A sort of alliance was created between Pasqua and 
the Senators. Each part maximised its utility in a "co-operative" context.  
 
•  Although it did not intervene directly in the FITTVN creation, the Ministry of Transport was 
one of the main beneficiary of this investments fund. Indeed, this investments fund represented 
an independent source of financing for the Ministry. FITTVN was seen as a "pool" where the 
Ministry could dip into to finance transport infrastructures without referring the matter to the 
Treasury. FITTVN allowed the Ministry to get round the budget constraint and to increase its 
discretionary power (viz. an increase of transport investments) without increasing public 
spending. The Transport Ministry gained on independence toward the Treasury. Its own interest 
                                                 
15 Up until 1997, the Land development was attached to the Home Affair. In 1997, it was attached to the Environment 
Ministry which became the Land development and Environment ministry. 
16 Weck-Hannemann H., Acceptance of pricing instruments in the Transport Sector. 1999 REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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converged on Pasqua and Senate's members ones. Nevertheless the FITTVN implementation 
had generated a power struggle between the Ministry of Transport and the Treasury. 
 
•  The Treasury function is to manage receipt and public expenditures by means of the General 
Budget. It wants to increase its discretionary power increasing the General Budget amount and 
therefore its superiority on other Ministries. The Ministry of Transport and the Treasury 
interests were different. The Treasury tried to limit independent investments fund like FITTVN 
and wanted to centralise resources in the General Budget in order to keep the control on every 
spending. The more investments funds were, the less the discretionary power of the Treasury 
was. So, as the years went by, the Treasury reduced the Ministry of Transports budget. 
Therefore, the Transports Ministry had to finance a part of functioning spending with FITTVN, 
initially dedicated to the infrastructures investments financing and this became inconsistent with 
FITTVN initial aim. The Treasury was one of the main opponent to FITTVN. 
 
•  The Environment Ministry did not intervene in the FITTVN implementation but it played a 
leading role in its functioning in particular with the Left-wing coming into the government in 
1997 and with "collectives services schemes" in 1999. As it said before, in 1997 the 
Environment Ministry became the Land development and Environment ministry. Between 1997 
and 2001 this ministry was managed by Dominique Voynet, leader of the "Green party". The 
increase of the Environment Ministry influence appeared in the increase of rail investments 
financed by FITTVN since 1997 (+ 33% between 1997 and 1998 and "only" +20% for road 
investments in the same period). The Environment Ministry was a "powerful ally" for the 
Ministry of Transport. 
 
•  Another group of actors involved in the FITTVN creation was composed of actors which 
financed FITTVN. They can be divided into two groups : motorways users and public firms 
producing hydroelectric power (viz. EDF and Compagnie Nationale du Rhône). 
•  Motorway users financed FITTVN with the Land Development Tax (LDT). The LDT 
amounted € 0.006 for kilometres covered in motorway.  
•  Public firms producing hydroelectric power financed FITTVN with an "hydroelectric 
tax" which amounted € 1.3 for kw/h produced.  
In this group we can add motorways companies. Although they didn't finance FITTVN directly, 
they collected taxes from motorway users and paid them to the State. It was an uncomfortable 
situation especially because the State imposed the payment of the LDT by motorways companies 
before they 
 
These two first of actors were seen as "milk cow". Indeed, motorway users are considered as 
"under-taxed" and EDF was a public firm (viz. under the State control) and its revenues were high. 
Nevertheless motorways users were not obliged to use the motorway network and therefore to pay 
the LDT. On the contrary firms producing hydroelectric power had to pay the "hydroelectric tax". 
They did not have alternative solutions.  
 
•  The last group of actors was not really involved in the FITTVN implementation but it played a 
leading role in the re-election process. This group was composed of citizens that is to say 
citizens as such voters, citizens as such transport users and to a lesser extend citizens as 
taxpayers.  
•  The citizens did not vote directly the Senators but local representatives who voted the 
Senators. This is an indirect suffrage. Nevertheless, the more investments financed by 
FITTVN were noticeable, the more they were tempted to re-elect their political 
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•  A part of citizens had benefit from investments financed by FITTVN. These agents lived 
in areas which benefited from new transport infrastructures.  
•  Citizens as taxpayers did not financed FITTVN. Not only general taxes did not increase 
but FITTVN favoured a decrease in the use of Ministries budget and therefore a decrease 
of general taxes. 
 
Two institutions have played a minor role in the FITTVN implementation : the European 
Commission and the members of the "Assemblée Nationale". 
 
•  The European Commission were initially not in favour of such an investments fund. Indeed the 
FITTVN functioning went against its directives. For example the fund reallocated to alternative 
modes revenues from road while the Council amending Directive 1999/62/EC stipulated that 
revenues had to be re-allocated to the mode they came from. 
 
•  The members of the "Assemblée Nationale" did not play a leading role in the implementation of 
FITTVN because the creation of this fund was a request of the Senators. Nevertheless at first 
they were not opposed to the fund which "had represented a progress at its beginning "17. The 
"Assemblée Nationale" started to criticised FITTVN when its majority changed and became on 
the left. The new majority asked the "Mission d'Evaluation et de Contrôle" (MEC) of the 
"Assemblée Nationale" to implement an audit on FITTVN. The conclusions of this evaluation 
had resulted in the end of FITTVN. To summarise the "Assemblée Nationale" position, we can 
say this institution had supported FITTVN as much as its majority was on the same wing as 
Senate’s one. 
 
We can illustrate the repartition of these different actors or group of actors in Table 2, underlying 
groups which benefit from FITTVN and others and those which benefit from the end of this fund.  
 
                                                 
17 Didier Migaud (Member of "Assemblée Nationale"), 20 october 2000. REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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•  Most of the Senators 
•  Ministry of Transport 
•  Environment and Land 
Development Ministry 
 
•  Taxpayers 
•  Citizens in beneficiary 
areas 
 
•  Treasury 













•  Tolled-motorways users 
•  EDF and “Compagnie 
Nationale du Rhône”. 
 
•  Senators 
•  Ministry of Transport and 
Land Development  
 
•  Tolled-motorway users 
•  EDF and “Compagnie 
Nationale du Rhône”. 
 
In bold types is underlined the coalition between Senators and some Ministries, in italics the other 
one with the Treasury and the "Assemblée Nationale". 
 
At the FITTVN creation, each group tried to defend its own interest. A coalition appeared between 
Senators, Ministry of Transport and Environment and Land Development Ministry which benefit 
from the implementation of a transport investment fund. Two other groups of citizens were in 
favour of FITTVN : citizens as taxpayers and citizens living in beneficiaries areas. While most of 
Senators and Ministries wanted to increase their discretionary power, for citizens FITTVN was a 
mean to increase their surplus. Indeed they benefit directly from new transport infrastructure for 
their transport consumption and these new infrastructures attract new users in less-developed areas. 
As the years went by, the opponents seemed to take the advantage, the Treasury was the main 
institution benefiting from the end of the fund. Indeed tolled-motorway users and EDF or CNR 
criticised an increase of their taxes but they were not so powerful to stop the fund. Moreover they 
continued to be taxed after the end of FITTVN. The abolition of FITTVN was mainly due to the 
coalition between the Treasury and the "Assemblée Nationale". 
 
During the FITTVN functioning there was a struggle between the Ministry of Transport and the 
Treasury to have the discretionary power. This struggle appeared mainly in the "tests of strength" 
during the yearly budget negotiations. The Treasury was very influent and placed the Ministry of 
Transport under its control. It was the Treasury which supplied Ministries and a transport 
investments fund was seen, for the Treasury, as, a lack of "co-operation" of the Transport Ministry. 
Indeed FITTVN represented a loss of information for the Treasury. While this Ministry had all the 
information and all revenues from transport pricing and other taxes, with FITTVN it had only a part 
of the information and of the revenues.  
 
Treasury was one of the main "institution" opposed to FITTVN and had an ally with the 
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political game : the change of government party. FITTVN was created by the Right-wing party in 
1995 but in 1997, the Left-wing came back into the government and had the majority in the 
"Assemblée Nationale" after the dissolution of this institution. The Left-wing party did not 
criticised the idea of an investments fund but the FITTVN implementation because it came back 
from the Right-wing. Moreover, in 2002 it will create two other intermodal investments fund. The 
Left-wing was in the Treasury side concerning the FITTVN issue. The Treasury wanted to stop 
FITTVN to increase its power (viz. its domination on the Ministry of Transport and the budget it 
managed) and the Left-wing wanted the end of the fund for two reasons :  
 
•  first because the left party was opposed to the Senate which had traditionally right-wing 
Senators. 
•  secondly because the "Assemblée Nationale" members, at this time favoured to the Left-wing, 
wanted to exert a democratic control on transport investments. They agreed with the Treasury 
which wanted to limit spending. 
 
2.5  Conclusion 
 
At its creation, FITTVN symbolised a new political trend aimed at land development and 
intermodal transport. It represented a tool to get round the budget constraint. Supplied with specific 
taxes, it was expected to be independent of the General Budget. Moreover these taxes, i.e. a tax on 
toll motorway users and a hydroelectric tax, were expected to provide a “sustainable” financing 
source. At the end the fund was suppressed while the motorway tax was maintained. 
 
Initially the fund had several advantages: launched by a political leader, with the support of elected 
representatives grounded in the roots of the electoral system, and based on “milk cow” revenue 
sources which had no real capacity to organise themselves as structured interest groups. 
 
However the development of FITTVN was subject to several weaknesses: 
•  a lack of clear definition of land development and intermodality promotion objectives; 
•  from this fuzziness of objectives the natural development faced with a budget constraint was a 
communicating vessels functioning which substituted the fund to the central government 
general budget rather than adding a new funding capacity; 
•  a lack of European support because of the then absence of clear definition of an 
“eurocompatible” functioning of this kind of fund. 
 
These weaknesses were exploited by several interest groups which gathered in a somewhat 
improbable coalition, like the one between the “Assemblée Nationale” and the Treasury. 
 
The main conclusion from this experience would be that there is a need for: 
•  a clear definition of objectives and scope of this kind of fund, and a strong legislative and 
institutional background, in order to resist to pressures, be they political or financial ones; 
•  a sound initial design and functioning operation in order to manage the interest groups and 
avoid the formation of too strong opposition coalitions: this means addressing legislative but 
also efficiency and equity aspects; 
•  the definition of conditions of euro-compatibility of this kind of fund: pricing rules, revenues 
use (e.g. which part of revenue users can go to finance which modes), etc. 
 
Obviously the two first points refer to central or local government levels while the third one refers 
to the European level. REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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Part 2: Assessment of regulation schemes for new 
transport infrastructure projects 
 
 
This part is devoted to the assessment of regulation schemes for the programme of transport 
infrastructure projects decided in December 2003 by the French government. These projects include 
interurban motorway and rail projects.  
 
The modelling tool (Molino) used for this assessment allows to evaluate demand reaction and 
welfare by comparison of different transport options (e.g. peak/off-peak, rail / road choice, tolled / 
non-tolled route choice), for different classes of traffic, passenger and freight. 
 
The programme of infrastructure projects include new motorway sections and rail lines (see maps 
below). Data on traffic and construction costs forecast are much more readily available for 
motorway projects than for rail projects. In fact, regarding rail projects, data availability is sufficient 
only for the Lyon-Turin project. Moreover the geographical configuration of the new projects 
indicate that the market competition of new motorway sections is rather with existing free parallel 
highways. 
 
These considerations, technical capabilities of the modelling tool, data availability and reality of 
market competition, make it relevant to separate the study into two parts. The first one addressed 
the assessment of regulation schemes only on the motorway projects while the second one assesses 
regulation schemes on the Lyon-Turin rail link jointly with the existing alpine parallel motorway 
crossings. 
 
In the following assessment the investment programme will not be questioned: this means that the 
use of money for purposes other than transport infrastructure is not discussed. Only alternative ways 
of financing this programme and the pricing of transport infrastructure will be considered. 
 
This evaluation is based on two case studies. The first, described in the next section, involved the 
financing and pricing of a programme of ten new motorway projects. The other case study is 
described in Section 4 and involves the cross-financing of the Lyon-Turin rail link from Alpine 
motorways. Finally some conclusions are drawn from the results of these two case studies. 
 
3. The financing and pricing of new motorway projects 
 
Ten new motorway projects were selected from the entire governmental programme, based on data 
availability which depends on how far planning has advanced. Table 3 gives an overview of the 
physical characteristics of these projects with basic financial data such as construction costs and the 
expected level of public subsidies. Moreover results of the studies about traffic forecast, tolls levels 
originally planned and the economy of these projects are taken for granted.  
 
The first stage was to address the issue of financing by comparing various financing schemes 
involving public subsidies with partial financing by a transport fund. Since money from public 
subsidies bears a cost (the marginal cost of public funds, MCPF) the sensitivity of the welfare 
computation to the level of the MCPF is briefly evaluated. The next stage was to vary the pricing, in 
particular to study the introduction of Short-run Marginal Cost Pricing (SMCP). Although it is 
known that SMCP is not optimal in the presence of financing constraints, it is nevertheless a useful REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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benchmark. Finally the combination of the advantages of SMCP and cross-financing from a 
transport fund have been evaluated. 
 
In all this study the new projects are taken as granted since the political decision about their 
advantage for the general welfare has already been taken: no assessment is made of the opportunity 
of achieving or not such or such project. Only are assessed within this program frame alternative 
ways of financing and pricing the use of infrastructure. 
Box 1 
The current tolling scheme on French motorways 
The French Revolution of 1789 abolished tolls on paths, bridges and city entrances (“péage 
d’octroi”) and introduced the principle of free usage of all roads in the name of equality between 
citizens. However, the need to fund transport infrastructure led to a law being passed in 1955 which 
authorised the creation of toll motorways: the operator was allowed to collect tolls from motorway 
users in order to pay off capital costs and maintain, or even extend, the motorway. However, the 
principle of a free alternative (for example a possible route using a parallel free road) had to be 
observed.  
 
On interurban tolled roads average (flat) distance-based pricing is applied with a distinction 
between freight and passenger vehicle classes. Tolls may vary from one motorway to another 
depending on the financial equilibrium of each concession. These tolls are fixed in the concession 
contracts. As regards revenue use, toll revenues go to the motorway concessionaire who invests, 
operates and maintains the infrastructure. This has made it possible for the costs at the level of the 
network operated by the concessionaire to be almost met, depending on the duration of the 
concession and on initial public subsidies in some cases.  
 
In addition, a regional development tax (“taxe d’aménagement du territoire”) is paid by toll 
motorway users and collected by the motorway operator (a tax of €0.007/km in 2000): the revenue 
from this tax is not earmarked and goes into the central government budget. 
 
Until recently, concessions for new motorway sections were awarded to an existing motorway 
concessionaire in the same geographical area: the concessionaire used a kind of cross-financing 
from paid-off sections of its own network to new ones most of which would not be profitable on 
their own. As a consequence of the European Council Directive 93/37/EEC concerning the 
procedures for awarding public works contracts, the government is now required to advertise the 
contracts for motorways in order to open up these contracts to effective Community-wide 
competition: this implies that competitors must be treated on an equal basis and that if subsidies are 
needed they should be the same for each competitor.  
 
3.1  Overview of the motorway projects 
 
Data input used (see Table 1) mainly come from an audit realised by the Conseil Général des Ponts 
et Chaussées in March 2003. This audit details most of the projects which will be partly financed by 
the AFITF. It provides traffic forecasts, costs of projects, speed, length of projects, travel time, tolls 
(see map in Figure 4).  



















120 km A1 Tolled 
motorway  




55 km N 75 
Highway  
€605 M €365 M 60%  2010-2015
A51 Motorway 
“Grenoble-Sisteron” 








64 km Highways 11 
and 135 
€468 M €243 M 52%  2009-2012
A89 Motorway 
“Lyon-Balbigny” 
50 km Highways 7, 
82 and 89 
€769 M €625 M 81%  2006-2011
A19 Motorway 
“Artenay-Courtenay” 
100 km N60 Highway  607 M€ €165 M 27%  2006-2009
A41 Motorway 
“Saint-Julien -Villy” 
18 km N201 
Highway 




52 km A47 Toll-free 
motorway  
1,300 M€ €1,118 M€ 86%  2008-2011
A65 Motorway “Pau-
Langon” 
142 km N10 and 
N134 
Highways  
€910 M €142 M 15%  2008-2011
*million €, excluding VAT 
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Figure 4: Map of the motorway projects 
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Motorway with private operator
Motorway with public operator
Highway 2*2ways
Motorway implemented with AFITF
subsidies




Motorway with private operator
Motorway with public operator
Highway 2*2 ways
Motorway to be implemented with
AFITF subsidies
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3.2  Methodology 
 
The Molino model has been used in a “two roads, passenger/freight” configuration: the first level is 
the choice between transport and other consumption, the second between travelling in a peak or an 
off-peak period and the third between the new motorway project and an alternative highway (see 
Figure 5). In practice, a new project, i.e. a new tolled motorway, is compared with a locally existing 
competing alternative, i.e. a parallel highway: these alternative roads are not tolled (see Table 3) 
except for the existing tolled A1 motorway which is an alternative to the A24.  
 
Molino is used in a static approach: the context is as if the new projects are implemented and in 
operation, and the consequences of variants of financing and pricing the use of infrastructure on 
welfare are assessed. This means that we take as given the level of traffic initially forecast for each 
project: this will be the basis upon which will be computed with Molino for instance the impact of 
pricing rule variants.  
 
Given the location of these projects it is assumed that network effects are negligible i.e. the opening 
of any of these new motorways have no impact on demand on the other new projects. Thus each 
project is assessed in this Molino configuration independently of the others. Moreover, since there 
is no interaction between projects, the overall welfare result can be obtained by summing the 
individual results. 
 
In the following assessment public subsidies and funds are exogenously allocated to each project. 
Transport fund allocation is based on an equal distribution of the fund’s financing capacity between 
the projects: competition for financing between the projects consequently receives no further 
attention. 
 
All the other parameters used in the modelling exercise are detailed in Appendix 1. 
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3.3  Results  
 
As previously stated, the first section will compare the performance of different means of financing 
while the second section will test the impact of the marginal cost of public funds on the first set of 
results. In the third section two main pricing rules will be assessed, the planned pricing and SMCP, 
before an analysis of the combination of SMCP and cross-financing in the last section. 
 
3.3.1.  The financing issue 
 
We shall now consider cross-financing performed through an investment fund that is independent 
from the general budget and financed by taxes on existing toll motorways. The fund partially 
finances each project by means of a grant. In order to determine this grant two hypotheses are made. 
First, it is assumed that the fund’s financing capacity remains stable during the first years. Second it 
is considered that the fund allocation for each project is proportional to the fund’s annual financing 
capacity. The proportion is computed on the basis of the ratio between the total subsidy needed by 
the project and the total expenditures of the fund during the period 2005-201218.  
 
                                                 
18 Taking the AFITF’s initial figures, it has been assumed that the fund’s financing capacity amounted to €635M/year 
(in the first years) to reach a total of €11,482M in the period 2005-2012.  REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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Alternative schemes  Pricing  Revenue use 
Planned tolling scheme 
+ public subsidies 
Tolling scheme as 
originally planned for the 
new projects 
Revenues from road tolls on each new motorway 
go to the motorway concessionaire.  
Additional public subsidies to cover new 
motorway construction costs. 
Planned tolling scheme 
+ transport fund + 
public subsidies 
Tolling scheme as 
originally planned for the 
new projects 
Revenues from road tolls on each new motorway 
go to the motorway concessionaire.  
Tax on existing toll motorways goes to the 
transport fund. The transport fund subsidises new 
motorways.  
Additional public subsidies when needed. 
Optimised tolls + 
transport fund + public 
subsidies 
Optimised tolls (only on 
new projects) 
As above 
Table 4: Overview of financing schemes 
 
Initially, the “planned toll + public subsidies” scheme has been compared with the “planned toll + 
transport fund + public subsidies” scheme (see Table 4). In the first scheme, the new motorway 
projects are financed from the forecast toll revenues for these projects supplemented by public 
subsidies obtained from fiscal revenues. In the second scheme, the new motorway projects are 
financed from the forecast toll revenues from these projects, subsidies from a transport fund and 
additional public subsidies when needed: this helps to lower the level of public subsidies.  
 
The difference between these two schemes essentially involves on the welfare cost of money: this 
cost is the Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCPF) in the case of public subsidies obtained from 
fiscal revenues while it corresponds to the welfare loss for toll road users when part of toll revenues 
is used to cross-finance other infrastructures (the MCPF issue is discussed below). 
 
The welfare loss resulting from taxation of tolls on existing motorways can be estimated on the 
basis of current demand on tolled motorways, the average toll and the empirical elasticity of 
motorway demand to tolls (approximately –0.5): this elasticity considers demand which escapes 
from motorway when toll increase, but this demand can take alternative free highway; so this 
evaluation of welfare loss is an excess estimate. The revenues from existing motorways for cross-
financing new ones roughly corresponds to the current regional development tax added to tolls 
(“taxe d’aménagement du territoire”) i.e. 0.007€/km. The impact of this tax on demand gives a 
welfare loss of € 0.023 per euro collected (see details in Appendix 3) .As shown below this has a 
marginal impact on overall welfare. 
 
The figures in Table 5 show that the introduction of the transport fund yields a slight welfare 
improvement (less than 6%) but a considerable increase in central government net revenues (+ 
20%), linked to the 95.5% reduction in public subsidies. The transport fund is more advantageous 
than a public subsidy mainly because of the lower level of money levy cost from tax on tolls when 
compared to the Marginal Cost of Public Funds.  
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  planned tolls + 
transport fund + 
public subsidies 
optimised tolls + 
transport fund + 
public subsidies 
Variation in overall welfare*  6.0% 5.9% 
Variation in overall welfare*
† 5.8% 5.7% 
Variation in Central Government Net Revenue  20% 20.5% 
Variation in need for public subsidies  -95.5% -99.8% 
Variation in Central tax revenues  23.4% 24.3% 
* with reference to the “planned toll + public subsidies” scheme  
† including welfare loss due to the payment of the regional development tax by toll motorway users 
Table 5: Comparison between financing schemes 
 
After this initial phase, the tolls on new motorways have been increased in order to reduce public 
subsidies as much as possible. For nine of the ten projects the toll increase makes it possible to 
abolish public subsidies (see Table 6). The A51 project is the only project that still needs public 
subsidies, but the level is very low, amounting to only 2% of the initial level of public subsidies.  
 
In spite of the reduction in public subsidies, the welfare comparison between the “planned toll + 
transport fund + public subsidies” scheme and the “optimised tolls + transport fund + public 
subsidies” scheme reveals no large differences, in fact a lower increase in global welfare (5.7% 
compared to 5.8%). This can be explained by the limited toll increases needed (between 3% and 
17%): these have a slight negative impact on demand while allowing only a limited additional 
decrease in public subsidies (–99.8% compared with –95.5%). 
 
  Planned tolls + transport fund  
+ public subsidies 
Optimised tolls + transport fund  
+ public subsidies 




















A 24  4%  -95%  0% 4% -100% 0% 
A48 23%  -96%  4% 24% -100% 4% 
A51 24%  -96%  8% 24% -99% 7% 
A585 154%  -100%  6% 153% -100% 6% 
A831 20%  -92% 2% 21% -100% 2% 
A89 53%  -96%  na** 55% -100% na** 
A19 17%  -93%  1% 18% -100% 1% 
A41 109%  -96%  6% 114% -100% 6% 
A45 28%  -96%  1% 30% -100% 1% 
A65 40%  -96%  3% 42% -100% 3% 
Total 20%  -92% 6% 21% -100% 5.9% 
Total
† 20%  -92%  5.8% 21% -100% 5.7% 
*with reference to the “planned toll + public subsidies” scheme 
**reference welfare (in “planned toll + public subsidies” scheme) nearly zero 
† including welfare loss due to the payment of the regional development tax by toll motorway users 
Table 6: Performance of financing schemes 
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3.3.2.  The issue of the Marginal Cost of Public funds  
 
Next, we shall explore the impact of the Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCPF) on welfare results. 
Since some studies for France give a figure of 1.13 for this (Bernard and Vielle, 2003, quoted in 
Lebègue et al, 2005), a conservative value of 1.1 has been used in this study. Other studies give 
values of 1.5 (Laffont, 1998, quoted in Lebègue et al, 2005).  
 
It is for this reason that the sensitivity of welfare improvement to MCPF has been tested with a 
value of 1.5. The “planned tolls + transport fund + public subsidies” scheme has been compared 
with the “planned tolls + public subsidies” scheme. An increase in welfare of 36% was observed, 
which corresponds exactly to the ratio between 1.5 and 1.1. The welfare result therefore depends 
directly on the MCPF value. This sensitivity test confirms the welfare benefit of financing these 
projects with a fund financed by external resources (such as contributions from motorway users 
which in our study yields a much lower levy cost) as compared with public subsidies from taxation. 
The benefits of the financing fund increase the higher the MCPF. 
 
3.3.3.  The optimal pricing issue 
 
The next analysis varies pricing in order to study the introduction of short-run marginal cost pricing 
(SMCP). It is accepted that the SMCP is not optimal in the presence of financing constraints, but it 
nevertheless provides a useful benchmark. This pricing is applied simultaneously on (planned) new 
motorways and on their competing existing (currently free) highways. In this analysis, SMCP is not 
applied to existing tolled motorways and they keep their current tolling scheme. Furthermore, 
according to the pure SMCP rule fuel taxes are abolished. 
 
Alternative schemes  Pricing  Revenue use 
Planned tolling scheme  Tolling scheme as 
originally planned for the 
new projects 
Revenues from road tolls on each new 
motorway go to the motorway concessionaire. 
No public subsidies 
Pure SMCP  SMCP pricing on new 
motorway projects and their 
free highway alternatives 
No transport fund. No public subsidies. 
Table 7: Overview of pricing schemes 
 
Two alternative pricing schemes have been tested: the “planned tolling” scheme and the “pure 
SMCP” scheme (see Table 7). In this section the construction costs issue has been ignored in order 
to focus on the pricing issue. In this hypothetical situation construction costs are deemed to have 
been paid from another source that is not considered in the welfare computation.  
 
Table 8 sets out the “pure SMCP” scheme results for each of the ten planned motorway projects in 
comparison with the “planned tolling” scheme results.  
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(€ per day) 
Toll 
revenues 
(€ per day) 
Fuel taxes + 
toll 
revenues 
(€ per day) 
SMCP 
revenues** 










A 24  1 020 599  703 379
†  1 723 978       574 946    -67% -69%  -0.1%
A48  290 383  132 889   423 272       165 862    -61% -66%  1.1%
A51  457 127   287 517   744 644       198 376    -73% -74%  2.8%
A585  55 913  21 818   77 730         42 385    -45% -65%  1.2%
A831  206 443  90 486   296 929       116 228    -61% -64%  1.1%
A89  263 721   117 982   381 703       147 727    -61% -68%  13.4%
A19  148 540   86 090   234 629         74 175    -68% -53%  0.7%
A41  85 085   68 054   153 139         80 492    -47% -67%  1.6%
A45  851 721   128 153   979 874       371 130    -62% -74%  -0.1%
A65  276 857   96 152   373 009       125 756    -66% -66%  0.8%
Total  3 656 389   1 732 519   5 388 908    1 897 076    -65% -66%  3.1%
*in comparison with the “planned tolling” scheme 
** including SMCP on new motorways and their highway alternatives 
*** SMCP revenues (in the “pure SMCP” scheme) – (Fuel taxes + toll) (in the “planned tolling” scheme) 
† including the A1 tolled alternative  
†† fuel taxes have been summed for new motorways and their highway alternatives 
Table 8: Performance of the pure SMCP scheme  
 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from Table 8: first, when the projects are aggregated, the “pure 
SMCP” scheme results in a slightly better (+3%) overall welfare result than the “planned tolling” 
scheme; second, total revenues are lower in the SMCP scheme (by 65%) (when comparing SMCP 
revenues to tolls + fuel tax revenues). Therefore the welfare impact of replacing fuel taxes and tolls 
by SMCP revenues would seem to be small.  
 
However, there are some disparities between individual projects. The welfare increase is by far the 
greatest (+13%) for the A89 motorway. This is a project with a low initial overall welfare (with the 
“planned tolling” scheme) and where the weight of fuel tax revenues in the overall welfare is far 
higher when compared to the other projects. This explains why once fuel taxes are removed the 
change in overall welfare is greater for the A89 than for other projects. 
 
For the other projects the overall welfare variation is positive but stays below 3%, apart from for the 
A24 and A45 where the welfare variation is almost zero (slightly negative). 
 
The low overall welfare increase can be explained by the initially low congestion level. Indeed, the 
main feature of the SMCP is that it varies according to the congestion level and some large 
variations in tolls occur when peak SMCP is compared to the initial flat toll (see Table 9). 
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Toll* on motorway  Toll* on highway** 
Planned tolling 
scheme  SMCP scheme  SMCP scheme 
Freight Passengers Freight  Passengers Freight Passengers 
Projects 
   Peak  Off-
peak  Peak Off-
peak  Peak Off-
peak  Peak Off-
peak 
A 24  1.77  4.17  7.73  1.41  15.90 1.60  4.82 1.57  9.08  1.71 
A48  1.06  1.97  1.52 0.71 2.88 1.03 2.92 0.70 6.02 0.99 
A51 10.95  4.04  1.33 0.99 2.03 1.27 6.48 1.59  12.72 1.65 
A585  0.59  1.41  0.45 0.39 0.90 0.77 1.10 0.37 2.40 0.74 
A831  1.13  2.66  1.98 0.82 3.75 1.13 3.14 0.94 6.15 1.17 
A89  0.87  1.84  1.41 0.65 2.68 0.98 3.22 0.88 6.41 1.13 
A19  3.10  4.39  3.29 1.20 6.16 1.44 4.29 1.32 8.18 1.46 
A41  0.62  1.24  0.57 0.32 1.27 0.72 1.18 0.36 2.60 0.73 
A45  0.85  1.78  0.77 0.68 1.20 1.00 2.68 0.79 5.34 1.06 
A65  2.89  5.01  6.22 1.66 12.15 1.83 5.49 1.68 10.35 1.73 
* per passenger or tonne per trip 
** all highways are toll free in the “planned tolling” scheme except for the A1 alternative to the A24 
Table 9: Toll on highways and motorways in the SMCP scheme compared with the “planned 
tolling” scheme 
 
However it should be remembered that with current traffic conditions on interurban roads the total 
duration of congestion is very short (200 hours per year on average). The decrease in peak period 
traffic, which represents a small proportion of total traffic, is compensated for by a considerable 
increase in off-peak traffic. This explains why each project experiences an overall increase in 
demand for both freight and passengers, which reveals a welfare gain for road users.  
 
Projects  Demand* on highways  Demand* on motorways  Total demand* 
 Freight    Passengers  Freight  Passengers Freight  Passengers 
A  24 10%  13%  17%  27%  11% 17% 
A48 -23%  -36%  36%  55%  9%  15% 
A51 -75%  -36%  299%  100% 76% 36% 
A585 -19%  -40%  56%  117%  5%  11% 
A831 -21%  -35%  83%  31%  13%  23% 
A89 -19%  -34%  31%  55%  13% 23% 
A19 -34%  -38%  47%  50%  8%  7% 
A41 -36%  -55%  51%  70%  17% 21% 
A45 -23%  -10%  22%  99%  11% 13% 
A65 -19%  -27%  48%  73%  11% 18% 
Total -10%  -22%  32%  42%  10%  18% 
*variation in passengers or tonnes per day with reference to the “planned tolling” scheme 
Table 10: Variations in demand between the “planned tolling” scheme and the “pure SMCP” 
scheme 
 
Highway demand decreases with SMCP pricing while demand increases on the motorway, except 
for the A24 motorway project (see Table 10). This overall result can be explained by the 
introduction of highway tolls and the reduction of motorway tolls.  
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Taking the example of the A41 motorway project, the decrease in alternative highway demand for 
freight (-36%) and passengers (-55%) can be explained by the introduction of a toll (see Table 9) of 
€0.358 (in off-peak periods) and €1.184 (in peak periods) per tonne for freight, and €0.73 (in off-
peak periods) and €2.6 (in peak periods) for passenger vehicles. On the other hand, the considerably 
lower toll level for freight and passenger vehicles in off-peak periods (respectively -48% and –42%) 
and small changes in tolls in peak periods (respectively –8% for freight and +3% for passengers) 
generate an increase in motorway demand. 
 
The A24 project is a specific case because the alternative road to the A24 motorway is also a tolled 
motorway (the A1) with a toll of €3.74 for passenger vehicles and €1.72 per tonne for freight. The 
A1 motorway already carries a high level of freight traffic. In this case, SMCP pricing increases 
peak tolls on both alternatives (an increase of between 140% and 180% on the A1 and of between 
282% and 336% on the A24) but decreases off-peak tolls especially for passengers (-180% on the 
A1 and –62% on the A24). For freight, the reduction of tolls on both routes is less than 20%. 
 
Another case the A51 project can also be highlighted. This exhibits the greatest decrease in highway 
freight demand and the greatest increase in motorway freight demand. The main reason is that the 
toll level decreases, particularly for freight (from €10.95 to €1.33 in peak periods and to €0.99 in 
off-peak periods). On the other hand, the toll implemented in the SMCP scheme on the alternative 
highway rises to €1.6 in off-peak periods and €6.5 in peak periods, which is at least twice as high as 
the other SMCP highway tolls. Freight road users are therefore encouraged to use the motorway. 
 
In Table 8 we can also note the sharp decrease in central government net revenues, between 53% 
and 74%, when one compares the “planned tolling” scheme and the SMCP scheme. The main 
reason is the absence of fuel tax in the SMCP scheme: this tax revenue represents more than twice 
the toll revenues in the “planned tolling” scheme. The other comparison issue relates to differences 
in taxes on profits between the two schemes: in the SMCP scheme all highway and motorway 
operator profits are fed into government revenues (because they are considered as public) while in 
other schemes the motorway operators are private and thus yield a 35% tax on profits. In spite of 
the increase in peak-period tolls, the implementation of tolls on previously free highways and the 
increase in overall demand, the revenues from operator profits are not sufficient to compensate for 
the absence of fuel tax revenues. 
 
To sum up the situation, the SMCP scheme generates an overall 65% reduction in road use pricing 
(toll + fuel taxes compared with SMCP) for both motorway and alternative highway users: this 
generates a 10% overall increase in freight traffic and an 18% overall increase in passenger traffic 
(see Table 10). When put in the balance against a decrease in central government net revenues due 
to the absence of fuel taxes, there is only a slight overall welfare improvement. 
 
Moreover there is a problem as regards the viability of such pricing because SMCP produces 
insufficient revenues to finance new projects. These revenues have to be made up by public 
subsidies. 
 
3.3.4.  The combination of SMCP and cross-financing 
 
The foregoing analyses of pricing and financing issues have indicated welfare improvements both 
when SMCP is applied and when cross-financing with a transport fund is implemented. The 
question then arose as to whether a combination of these pricing and financing approaches would 
perform better. To ascertain this we compared a “pure SMCP + transport fund + public subsidies” 
scheme with a “planned tolling + public subsidies” scheme (see Table 11). The main difference 
between the two schemes was the road pricing rule and the absence of fuel taxes in SMCP.  REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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Alternative schemes  Pricing  Revenue use 
Planned tolling scheme 
+ public subsidies 
Tolling scheme as 
originally planned for the 
new projects 
Revenues from road tolls on each new 
motorway go to the motorway 
concessionaire.  
Public subsidies when needed. 
Pure SMCP + transport 
fund + public subsidies 
SMCP pricing on the new 
motorway projects and their 
free highway alternatives 
Tax on existing toll motorways go to the 
transport fund. Transport fund subsidises the 
new motorways. 
Public subsidies when needed. 
Table 11: Overview of pricing and cross-financing schemes 
 
The combination of SMCP pricing and cross-financing generates a welfare increase of 9.2% when 
compared to the “planned tolling + public subsidies” scheme (see Table 12).  
 









A 24  -66% -45%  1%
A48 -101% -58%  5%
A51 -138% -99%  7%
A585 -61% -55%  9%
A831 -99% -55%  4%
A89 -101% -51%  NA**
A19 -118% -70%  1%
A41 -138% -71%  6%
A45 -83% -47%  1%
A65 -94% -46%  4%
Total -90% -55%  9.4%
Total
† -90% -55%  9.2%
*compared with the “planned toll + public subsidies” scheme 
**reference welfare (in “planned toll + public subsidies” scheme) nearly zero 
† including welfare loss due to the payment of the regional development tax by toll motorway users 
 
Table 12: Comparison between “planned toll + public subsidies” scheme and “pure SMCP + 
transport fund + public subsidies” scheme 
 
This overall result sums up the situation for most of the projects studied. Indeed, the combination of 
SMCP and a transport fund improves the welfare result for all the projects. However the welfare 
increase is generally low, in spite of a decrease in central government tax revenues (mainly the fuel 
taxes which are suppressed with the SMCP).  
 
3.4  Conclusion for the road case study 
 
By way of a preliminary conclusion, a comparison of the tested schemes shows that the 
combination of pure SMCP with cross-financing by a transport fund and public subsidies when 
needed yields the greatest overall welfare. This can be easily explained, first because the 
implementation of cross-financing generates an increase in overall welfare, and second because 
SMCP pricing and reducing road user taxes generate an overall demand increase and a welfare gain.  
 REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
36 
4. Cross-financing from road to rail: the Lyon-Turin rail 
link 
 
The Lyon-Turin rail link has been used for the assessment of rail projects for many reasons. The 
first reason is that this rail link is part of the Trans-European Network and symbolises European 
transport policy which is based on intermodality and the development of alternative transport 
infrastructures to road. The second reason is more technical; in the case of the Lyon-Turin project a 
competing parallel road option can be clearly identified. This means the rail and road alternatives 
can be compared, making it easier to use the Molino model.  
 
Here again the Lyon-Turin project is taken as granted. Only are assessed alternative ways of 
financing and pricing the use of infrastructure. 
 
4.1  Overview of the Lyon-Turin rail project 
 
The implementation of a new rail link between Lyon and Turin has been projected since 1990. It 
was confirmed as one of the main projects of the French transport policy in the Inter-ministerial 
Committee for Regional Development (CIADT) in December 2003. It constitutes a priority 
infrastructure for the European Union as a part of the TEN. Indeed the Lyon-Turin link is situated at 
the centre of European axes between North and South and East and West and constitutes a 
development axe at different levels.  
 
First it is expected that the rail project will make easier the flow of traffic between European Union 
countries and improve economic trade between North and South European countries.  
 
Secondly at a regional level the Lyon-Turin project is expected to improve transfer from road to rail 
and balance the traffic between these two modes. In the 25 last years in the alpine area road traffic 
increase was twice as high as rail one mainly owing to road transport investments. A rail link 
investment appears as necessary to develop rail transport. Moreover as it is underlined by the Lyon-
Turin Ferroviaire (LTF) company “by the year 2015, the existing road and rail infrastructures will 
be saturated”. Another aspect of the implementation of the rail link is the reduction of 
environmental impacts. According to the LTF study “each day, more than 6000 lorries cross the 
valley of Maurienne in Savoy and the Valley of Suse in Piedmont (in mid-week). The transfer of 
goods traffic from the road to the rail (traditional trains and "railway motorway") will reduce the 
emissions of toxic pollution in the atmosphere by about 360 tons per day ”and respect the Kyoto 
protocol.  
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Figure 6: Map of the Lyon-Turin rail project 
 
Origin : www.ltf-sas.com/ ita/obiettivi.htm  
 
The new link between Lyon and Turin is divided into 8 projects. The total costs amounts 9.759 
billion € (present value 2005), 8.631 billion € are expected to be publicly financed (see Table 13).  
 
 








Alpine high  speed 1898 155
0 Access to the Chartreuse tunnel 644 579
1st line Chartreuse tunnel 1503 1353
2nde line Chartreuse tunnel 536 483
1st line Belledonne tunnel 1310 118
1 2nde line Belledonne tunnel 461 418
Studies and galleries reconnaissance, French part 235 235
Franco-Italian part 3172 2832
Total Lyon-Turin 9759 8631 
 
Data input mainly come from an a synthesis made by the society “Lyon-Turin Ferroviaire” on 
traffic and on the profitability of the link Lyon-Turin. It provides traffic forecasts, costs of projects, 
speed, length of projects, travel time, tolls (see map in Figure 6). Concerning road, traffic and costs 
data come from motorway societies activity reports. 
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4.2  Methodology 
 
The assessment focuses on the cross-financing of new rail infrastructures by road revenues with five 
different pricing and financing schemes summarised in Table 14 below. The transport fund 
considered here is slightly different from that described in the previous section. A kind of “Alpine 
fund” has been devised where only the two Alpine motorway crossings (Mont-Blanc and Fréjus) 
which compete with the Lyon-Turin rail link would be a possible source of cross-financing. 
 
Alternative pricing and 
funding schemes 
Pricing Revenue  use 
Current motorway tolling 
scheme + public subsidies 
Current tolling scheme 
on alpine motorways 
Rail revenues go to rail operator or 
manager.  
 
Toll revenues go to motorway operator. 
 
Public subsidies for the rail link. 
 
No cross-financing. 
Increase in alpine motorway 
tolls by 25% + transport 
fund + public subsidies 
Mark-ups (25%) on 
current tolling scheme 
on alpine motorways 
Rail revenues go to rail operator or 
manager.  
 
“Base” toll revenues go to motorway 
operator. Additional surplus of alpine 
motorways goes to the Alpine fund which 
subsidises the rail link. 
 
Public subsidies when needed. 
Increase in alpine motorway 
tolls by 80% + transport 
fund + public subsidies 
Mark-ups (80%) on 
current tolling scheme 
on alpine motorways 
As above. 
Current motorway tolling 
scheme + transport fund 
Current tolling scheme 
on alpine motorways. 
 
Tax on existing toll motorway (whole 
national network) goes to the transport 
fund. The transport fund subsidises the rail 
link.  
 
Rail revenues go to rail operator or 
manager. 
Increase in alpine motorway 
tolls by 25% + transport 
fund 
Mark-ups (25%) on 
current tolling scheme 
on alpine motorways 
Tax on existing toll motorway (whole 
national network) goes to the transport 
fund. The transport fund subsidises the rail 
link.  
 
Additional surplus of alpine motorways 
goes to the Alpine fund which subsidises 
the rail link. 
 
Rail revenues go to rail operator or 
manager. 
Table 14: Overview of alternative pricing and financing schemes for the Lyon-Turin rail link 
 
The Molino model is used in a “road/rail, passenger/freight” configuration: the first level involves 
the choice between transport and other consumption, the second the choice between travelling in 
peak or in off-peak periods and the third the choice between existing motorways and the future rail 
link (see Figure 7). 
 
Here again Molino is used in a static approach: we take as given the level of traffic initially forecast 
by the “Lyon-Turin Ferroviaire” company.  REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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In the first scheme the “current tolling scheme” is applied (the current tolling scheme on existing 
Alpine motorways) while public subsidies contribute to the financing of the future Lyon-Turin rail 
link. The second and third schemes include an investment fund (Alpine fund) with existing Alpine 
motorway companies providing cross-financing to the Lyon-Turin rail project19. First an increase of 
motorway tolls of 25%20 has been considered. It has been assumed that the motorway operator 
transfers the resulting increase in gross operating surplus to the fund. Next, in order to lower further 
the level of public subsidies needed for the financing of the rail link, an increase in tolls of 80% has 
been considered. This level of 80% corresponds to the toll that maximises the gross operating 
surplus of motorway operators, taking into account its effect of decreasing road demand. In the 
fourth scheme the same transport fund as in the road case study is considered instead of the Alpine 
fund: that is to say the regional development tax on existing toll motorway (whole national 
network) goes to the national transport fund which subsidises the rail link; it is assumed that the 
fund covers all the subsidy needs21. In the fifth scheme the national transport fund would be used as 
a remainder to the Alpine fund (with a mark-up of 25% on current tolling on alpine motorways) in 
order to subsidise the rail link. The purpose of these two last schemes is to assess the relative 
welfare performances of the financing by the national transport fund when compared with markups 
on tolls on Alpine motorways. 
 
Other assumptions are detailed in Appendix 2.  
 
                                                 
19 The timing of investment is identical in the different alternatives. 
20 This figure is based on the Directive proposal COM (2003) 448 which suggested allowing  a 25% maximum mark-up 
on toll on motorways in environmentally sensitive areas in order to cross-finance alternative rail routes. 
21 In this case the whole financing capacity of the national fund would be allocated to the Lyon-Turin rail link during its 
construction period (i.e. about 10 years). REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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4.3  Results  
 
Table 15 gives the variation between each the fourth schemes and the “current toll + public 









80%         
National 
Transport 




markups of 25% 
Variation in overall welfare*  0.1% 0.2% 1%  1%
Low income passengers welfare variation*  3% 8% 14%  16%
High income passengers welfare variation*  1% 4% 4%  5%
Variation in central government net revenue*  36% 89% 137%  155%
Variation in public subsidies*  -14% -24% -100%  -100%
Variation in road operator profits*  0% 0% 0%  0%
Variation in rail operator profits*  18% 57% 0%  18.4%
Variation in rail infrastructure manager profits*  19% 58% 0%  18.8%
*with reference to the “current toll + public subsidies” scheme 
Table 15: Results for the Lyon-Turin rail project for the different schemes 
 
4.3.1.  Alpine fund with road toll mark-ups of 25%  
 
This scheme has a small impact on overall welfare which remains stable. However it generates a 
slight increase in the welfare of high and low income passengers (respectively +1% and +3%). If 
the variation in low income welfare is compared with the variation in high income welfare, it is 
apparent that an increase in road tolls favours low income welfare more than high income welfare. 
Indeed, the higher central government revenues are, the greater the redistribution to low income22. 
This redistribution effect stems from the fact that low income households account for 60% of all 
households.   
 
The 25% toll increase generates an increase in central government net revenue (+36%) mainly 
because of a reduction in public subsidies (by 14%). However this has a low impact on overall 
welfare.  
 
Both rail operators and managers benefit from the road toll increase. The profits of operators and 
managers increase by more than 19%: this results from the modal transfer from road to rail. Road 
operator profits are not modified because the surplus resulting from toll mark-ups is transferred to 
the fund. 
 
4.3.2.  Alpine fund with road toll mark-ups of 80%  
 
This scheme applies the same rules as above but with a toll increase of 80%.  
 
As with the previous toll mark-up scheme, the level of welfare remains stable compared with the 
initial situation. However the partial welfare levels (low and high income) rise more, by 8% and 4% 
respectively. The public subsidies decrease by 24%. Therefore the road toll increase generates an 
increase in central government net revenues of nearly 90%. The considerable increase, of 
approximately 57%, in the profits of rail operators and infrastructure managers is noteworthy. 
 
                                                 
22 The welfare difference between high and low income passengers has not been tested for the road case study. REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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As a side-effect, it is possible to analyse road/rail modal split, on which the motorway toll levels 
impacts clearly (see Table 16). Rail’s share of passenger transport increases with motorway toll 
levels, but this effect is higher during off-peak than peak periods, and much higher off-peak when 





tolling scheme  
25% toll increase  80% toll increase  
Passenger      Peak  Off-peak  Peak  Off-peak 
Rail    40%*  43% 47% 46% 61% 
Road    60%  57% 53% 54% 39% 
Freight      Peak  Off-peak  Peak  Off-peak 
Rail    50%*  57% 42% 69% 72% 
Road    50%  43% 58% 31% 28% 
*according to LTF forecasts 
Table 16 : Results as regards modal shares 
With regard to freight demand, starting from an initial equal split between rail and road, rail only 
becomes dominant in peak periods when the motorway toll increases by 25%. In off-peak periods 
the motorway retains a higher share (58%): this can be explained by the fact that the toll is higher 
on rail than on road (€40 per tonne by rail compared with €32 by road) and maximum speeds on 
both modes are identical. It is only when the road toll increases by 80% that rail freight becomes 
dominant in both peak (69%) and off peak periods (72%). 
 
4.3.3.  National transport fund alone vs. in combination with an alpine fund 
 
The two last schemes compare the advantages of a complete coverage of the subsidies need with on 
the one hand the national transport fund alone and on the other hand the alpine fund completed with 
the national transport fund. 
 
In spite of the complete coverage of the subsidies need the overall welfare is only slightly improved 
(+1% in both cases). Note that this welfare variation includes the welfare loss incurred by 
motorway users whether they pay the regional development tax on the existing national toll 
motorway network or the 25% mark-up on toll on the alpine motorways. 
 
It follows from the absence of public subsidy need that the central government net revenues are 
greatly increased (+137% and +155%). Because of the redistribution by the central government the 
welfare of low income passengers is much more improved (+14% and +16%) when compared with 
the two previous schemes, and more than three times higher than the improvement of welfare of 
high income passengers. 
 
The comparison of the two pricing and financing alternatives shows no difference in overall 
welfare. The main advantage of financing the rail link partly with the toll markup on the alpine 
motorway would be a policy matter: the financial balances of the rail operator and manager would 




The first lesson from this motorway programme analysis relates to the financing issue. When 
compared with public subsidies from the general budget, cross-financing from existing motorways 
to new motorways slightly increases the level of welfare for all the projects. This overall result is a 
consequence of the fact that public subsidies bear a levy cost in the economy (i.e. the Marginal Cost 
of Public Funds) while a lower levy cost is associated with subsidies from a transport fund (when 
revenues come from a mark-up on tolls as in our study). Moreover the sensitivity of welfare 
improvement depends directly on the level of the Marginal Cost of Public Funds. Note that, because 
of this difference in levy cost, this only shows the advantage of direct earmarking of additional 
taxes on tolls, whether transiting through a transport fund or not, compared to public subsidies 
coming from the general levy of public money. 
 
Secondly, with regard to optimal pricing, SMCP permits a slight increase in overall welfare when 
compared with the planned tolling scheme, despite the low forecast level of congestion on the 
studied projects. This can mainly be explained by the fact that road traffic will increase since the 
overall costs borne by the road users would be reduced by 65% when switching from fuel taxes plus 
planned tolls to SMCP. However because of the low level of congestion, pure SMCP cannot solve 
financing problems. It must be supplemented by subsidies from a transport fund or from central (or 
local) governments. This does not mean that new investments are not justified. Indeed, motorway 
projects are planned mainly not to reduce congestion but to improve the quality and safety of road 
transport. This improvement and especially the expected time savings induce a socio-economic rate 
of return high enough to motivate the interest of the community to achieve these projects. 
 
Therefore, while pure SMCP is more efficient as regards pricing (without considering financing 
problems) and cross-financing appears to be more efficient as a means of financing new motorway 
projects, the combination of the two rules would increase overall welfare. Indeed for all projects the 
scheme that combines pure SMCP with cross-financing provides the greatest increase in overall 
welfare of all the alternative schemes.  
 
Concerning the rail-road study, the assessment of the Lyon-Turin rail project shows the limited 
impact on welfare of cross-financing rail by road by the means of toll mark-ups on alternative 
Alpine motorways. However there would be a higher redistribution toward low income passengers 
compared with high income ones and the financial balances of the rail operator and manager would 
be improved while the rail mode share would increase.  
 
It should be stressed that while public subsidies amount to 88% of the construction costs in the first 
scheme (no cross-financing) this level of public subsidies decreases by 14% and 24% with cross-
financing by motorway toll mark-ups of respectively 25% and 80%.  
 
The introduction of the same national transport fund as in the road case study would yield some 
advantage when combined with the alpine fund supplied by toll mark-ups, by achieving the 
complete coverage of the subsidy need while keeping the improvement of the financial balances of 
the rail operator and manager and of the rail mode share. 
 
Moreover, the revenues from road toll mark-ups only consider traffic crossing the Franco-Italian 
border through the Mont-Blanc and Fréjus tunnels. The toll mark-up base could be widened to all 
traffic using the Alpine motorway network, on the premise that this traffic would benefit from lower 
road congestion resulting from modal transfer to rail: this would yield much higher revenues. 
However this option raises policy and equity issues which require more thorough analysis. 




Appendix 1: Assumptions and supplementary data  
 
Traffic data 
Road traffic is based on the audit data (IGF and CGPC, 2003). With regard to the distinction 
between local and transit traffic, local traffic is considered to be domestic while transit traffic 




For roads, the hypothesised occupancy rates for the two case studies are 8.6 tonnes for freight 
vehicles and 1.9 passengers for passenger vehicles. For rail, the occupancy rates given in the traffic 
forecasts made by the “Lyon-Turin Ferroviaire” company have been used (400 passengers/train and 
280 tonnes/train). 
 
Congestion periods  
Congestion on interurban roads is limited to 200 hours per year, or about 0.02 hours a day. 8% of 
passengers (cars and rail) and 2% of heavy goods vehicles and freight trains use infrastructures in 
peak periods (see EMCT case study for France, 2003). 
 
Monetary costs 
For passenger road vehicles, resource costs are made up of purchasing expenditures, financial 
expenditures, car insurance, fuel (without taxes), maintenance (without taxes) and parking. For 
freight road vehicles, they include fuel, tyres, maintenance, insurance, purchasing or hiring 
expenditures and staff wages.  
 
For passenger road vehicles central taxes essentially consist of fuel taxes. For road freight vehicles 
only fuel tax and axle tax have been considered (because VAT is recovered by firms). Based on a 
paper on fuel consumption in France (Girault et al, 2000), the level of “central taxes on transit 
freight” has been considered to be 40% of “central taxes on local freight”.  
 
There are no resource costs for rail passengers and freight. Rail passengers pay only the VAT on the 
transport ticket fare. There is no central tax for rail freight transport. 
 
Tolls 
In the road case study, the level of tolls refers to the tolls estimated in the audit for each planned 
motorway project.  
 
Speeds 
For both road and rail modes, maximum speed is considered to be identical for passenger and 
freight. The same applies to peak period speed.  
 
On road the maximum speed is higher for motorways (based on the 130 km/h speed limit on French 
motorways) than for “conventional” highways (between 70 km/h and 100 km/h according to local 
topography). The speed during congestion is 60 km/h. In some cases mountainous terrain reduces 
both motorway and highway speeds.  
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Table 17: Speed inputs for the different road projects 
Max speed Congestion Max speed Congestion
A 24 project 130 km/h 60 km/h 110 km/h 60 km/h
A48 project 130 km/h 60 km/h 100 km/h 60 km/h
A51 project 110 km/h 60 km/h 70 km/h 50 km/h
A585 project 110 km/h 60 km/h 70 km/h 50 km/h
A831 project 130 km/h 60 km/h 70 km/h 50 km/h
A89 project 110 km/h 60 km/h 70 km/h 50 km/h
A19 project 130 km/h 60 km/h 70 km/h 50 km/h
A41 project 120 km/h 60 km/h 70 km/h 50 km/h
A45 project 110 km/h 60 km/h 100 km/h 60 km/h





The official value of time is used for time costs for passengers (see CGP, 2001): this is equal to €12 
/hour for distances up to 310 km. Using the same guide, operating costs are estimated at €31.4/hour 
for road freight vehicles. So, taking 8.6 tonnes of freight per vehicle, the VOT is estimated at 
€3.65/tonne/hour. 
 
Share of household expenditure devoted to transport  
The share of household expenditure devoted to transport has been taken from DAEI/SES (2003). 
This data make no distinction between low and high income, so a single value has been taken for 
both categories and 15.02% of household income is considered to be spent on transport 
consumption. Concerning freight transport expenditures, a single margin rate (the share of transport 
compared to total production and importation) of 3.4% has been applied. 
 
Elasticities of substitution 
With regard to transport/other consumption and peak/off peak elasticities the elasticities used in the 
TRENEN model (interregional model) and reported in (ECMT, 2003) have bee used. For peak and 
off-peak elasticities between motorways and highways we have sought values that give an 
acceptable value for the toll-elasticity of demand on toll motorways: investigation of some projects 
has given empirical values of between –0.4 and –0.5 on French toll motorways. The values of 












low-income  0.4 0.8 18 6
high-income 0.4 0.8 18 6
local  0.2 0.5 4 3.5




Table 18: Elasticities of substitution 
 
For the rail/road case study, after verification the same values were used for all elasticities as for 
roads (the peak and off-peak elasticities between alternative roads become the peak and off-peak 
elasticities between rail and road).  
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Other costs 
For the road case study, the motorway costs are based on data from the ASF report (2004). 
Operating costs include purchases and staff costs. The operating cost data is not sufficiently detailed 
to distinguish fixed operating costs, so these have been included in the “variable operating costs”. In 
France, there is no distinction between the motorway manager and the motorway operator, so 
maintenance costs have been included with “variable operating costs”. The detailed financial 
charges for the new road projects are not known: from this it follows that the “profit” (of road 
operators and infrastructure managers) used in the Molino model is actually the gross operating 
surplus (GOS). However since the scenarios have only been compared with each other, the 
variations in welfare that result from variations in the GOS are correct. 
 
External costs 
These are given in (CGP, 2001): in 2001, transport pollution was estimated at €0.009 /vehicle/km 
for passenger vehicles and €0.062/vehicle/km for freight. 
 
Welfare parameters and weights 
The difference between a public and a private operator is made by the input “profit tax”. This tax 
ratio is equal to 1 when the operator is public. In this case all profits are paid to central government. 
When the operator is private, as is the case with road and rail operators, the profit tax ratio is equal 
to 0.35.  
 
The model parameter beta is equal to 0.5: this means that central government revenues are equally 
allocated between the high and the low income users. 
 
2005 prices have been considered with an inflation rate of 1.8% per year.  
 
Table 19: Weights applied in Molino for the road case study 
weights low passengers (wl) 1
high passengers (wh) 1
local freight (wloc) 0.5
transit freight (wtran) 0






beta operator 1 0.05
beta operator 2 0.05
beta infrastructure 1 0.05
beta infrastructure 2 0.05  
 
We did not consider difference in contract efficiency (tendering parameter set to 1) 
 
Public subsidies vs other funding 
Molino is used in a static approach, that is to say as if the new projects are implemented and in 
operation. Molino computes the traffic and financial flows on a daily basis. In order to establish a 
common daily basis of comparison between construction subsidies and private or transport fund 
financing, it is assumed for each project that public subsidies would be financed by a government 
loan of a 30 years duration with a 4% interest rate. By this way it is possible to compute a daily REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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level of public subsidy broken down for the duration of the concession. This rule is also applied in 
the rail-road (Lyon-Turin) study. 
 
 
Appendix 2: Assumptions and additional data specific to the rail-road case study 
 
The rail operator is private while the rail manager is public. The road operator and manager are both 
private. 
 
Road traffic consists of the number of vehicles crossing the frontier between France and Italy. The 
traffic data given by the two motorway operators (ATMB and SFTRF) through the Mont-Blanc and 
Fréjus tunnels in 2003 has been aggregated. An increase of 3% per year was applied in order to 
obtain traffic forecasts for 2015.  
 
Rail traffic data have been obtained from the forecasts of traffic for 2015 made by the “Lyon-Turin 
Ferroviaire” company (LTF, 2003a). These are daily estimated rail passenger traffic in Modane 
(night and day trains) according to the LTF-scenario V423. Freight traffic forecasts have been 
considered at the border crossing. 
 
High and low income passengers have been distinguished for both road and rail traffic. It has been 
assumed that 33% of passenger traffic is drawn from low income24 households (Hivert, 2000). 
 
Road toll levels are those applied for a trip between Lyon and Turin according to the type of 
vehicle. Rail tolls for passengers correspond to the ticket price paid to the railway operator SNCF 
by travellers. We consider that low income passengers travel second class while high income travel 
first class. Freight rail tolls are based on the SNCF price for freight traffic. 
 
For the maximum rail speed, the maximum passenger speed (220 km/h) and freight speed (120 
km/h) were weighted in proportion to the share of each, i.e. a maximum speed of 130 km/h. For 
peak period speed the assumption was that travel time for passenger and freight trains is increased 
by one hour. As stated above, the passenger speed (128 km/h) and the freight speed (86 km/h) were 
weighted in proportion to the shares of passenger and rail trains, giving 90 km/h.  
 
Motorway costs were computed from specific operating costs for Alpine motorways, based on 
financial reports (see ATMB, 2004; MINEFI, 2004). Rail operating costs are taken from the SNCF 
report (2002). They include operating costs without infrastructure tolls and make a separation 
between freight trains and high speed trains. 
 
The rail infrastructure cost corresponded to the infrastructure tolls paid by the rail operator (in our 
case SNCF) to the infrastructure manager (RFF). The amount of the tolls are given in the LTF 
study.  
 
In the rail-road case study the model parameter beta is equal to 0.6: this means that 60% of the tax 
revenues of central government are allocated to low income users who represent 60% of 
households. 
 
                                                 
23 growth rate: 1.8%, speed in tunnel: 220 km/h, €20 of additional tax on international trains and a decrease by 10% of 
air fares linked to the low-cost companies development. 
24 income lower or equal to €1,900 per “consumption unit” per month REVENUE C ASE STUDY 4 .4. THE FRENCH MULTIMODAL FUND 
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Table 20: Weights applied in Molino for the Lyon-Turin rail lik case study 
weights low passengers (wl) 1
high passengers (wh) 1
local freight (wloc) 0.5
transit freight (wtran) 0






beta operator 1 0.05
beta operator 2 0.05
beta infrastructure 1 0.05




Appendix 3: Welfare loss resulting from toll tax (regional development tax) 
 
The welfare loss resulting from the payment of a land development tax by motorways users is 
calculated from the motorway traffic and the toll level in 2003 with a toll elasticity of demand 
amounting to -0.5. According to DAEI/SES and Autoroutes de France, we consider a heavy goods 
vehicle (HGV) yearly traffic of 12 billion vehicle-km, paying an average toll of € 0.1964 per km, 
and a yearly car traffic of 62.4 billion vehicle-km paying an average toll of € 0.0687 per km. The 
tax applied on tolls amounts to € 0.007 by vehicle-km. So we estimate a welfare loss of € 11.9 
million (€ 11.1 million for cars and € 0.8 million for HGV). This gives a € 33 thousand daily loss. 





Appendix 4: Tables of detailed results for each project 
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Toll on motorway Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
Passenger toll  15.90 1.60 15.90 1.60
Passenger toll variation* 282% -62% 282% -62%
Freight toll  7.73 1.41 7.73 1.41
Toll freight variation* 336% -20% 336% -20%
Demand on motorway
Passengers demand variation*
 Freight demand variation*
Toll on highway
Passenger toll  9.08 1.71 9.08 1.71
Freight toll  4.822 1.566 4.822 1.566
Demand on highway
Passengers demand variation*
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Scenario 3     Increased 
tolls + transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 4     
"Pure" SMCP
Scenario 5            
Pure SMCP + transport 
fund + public subsidies
Scenario 2   Usual tolls 
+ transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 1 : Usual 
tolling scheme + 
public subsidies
A 24 project





Scenario  : Tolls + transport fund 
(AFITF) + public subsidies
Scenario  : SMCP




Public subsidies (€/day )
Central goverment revenues (€/day)
 Highway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of highway operator GOS*
 Motorway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of motorway operator GOS *
Global welfare variation*
Low income welfare variation*
High income welfare variation*
AFITF subsidies (€/day)
*with reference to scenario 1
**toll per passenger or ton per trip
Scenario: Usual 
tolling scheme + 
public subsidies
Scenario : Tolls + transport fund 
(AFITF) + public subsidies
Scenario  : SMCP
60 267 2 735 -324 873
1 483 330 1 540 862 1 545 637
468 160 468 160 469 820
0.00% 0.35%
484 287 809 160
390 756 390 756
-16.53% -16.53%
156 679 156 679 159 393 93 531 93 531
N.C
N.C 0.00% 1.73%
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Toll** on motorway Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
Passenger toll  2.88 1.03 2.88 1.03
Passenger toll variation* 46% -48% 46% -48%
Freight toll  1.52 0.71 1.52 0.71
Toll freight variation* 44% -33% 44% -33%
Demand on motorway
Passengers demand variation*
 Freight demand variation*
Toll** on highway
Passenger toll  6.02 0.99 6.02 0.99
Freight toll  2.924 0.700 2.924 0.700
Demand on highway
Passengers demand variation*
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Scenario 3     
Increased tolls + 
transport fund + public 
subsidies
Scenario 4    
"Pure" SMCP
Scenario 5           
Pure SMCP + 
transport fund + public 
subsidies
Scenario 2   Usual tolls 
+ transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 1 : Usual 
tolling scheme + 
public subsidies
A 48 project





Scenario  : Tolls + transport fund 
(AFITF) + public subsidies




Public subsidies (€/day )
Central goverment revenues (€/day)
 Highway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of highway operator GOS*
 Motorway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of motorway operator GOS *
Global welfare variation*
Low income welfare variation*
High income welfare variation*
AFITF subsidies (€/day)
*in reference to scenario 1
** toll per passenger or ton per trip
0.40% -0.48%
-24 789 25 273
Scenario  : SMCP
25 273
-0.49%
53 973 53 973 0 56973
0.36% 4 713 795
2.18% 3.30% 3.19%
0.37% 0.37% 0.80% 0.78%
-1 623 999
105 059 77 783 102 229
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Scenario : Usual 
tolling scheme + 
public subsidies
Scenario  : Tolls + transport fund 
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Toll** on motorway Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
Passenger toll  2.03 1.27 2.03 1.27
Passenger toll variation* -50% -69% -50% -69%
Freight toll  1.33 0.99 1.33 0.99
Toll freight variation* -88% -91% -88% -91%
Demand on motorway
Passengers demand variation*
 Freight demand variation*
Toll** on highway
Passenger toll  12.72 1.65 12.72 1.65
Freight toll  6.482 1.590 6.482 1.590
Demand on highway
Passengers demand variation*









Scenario  : Tolls + transport fund 
(AFITF) + public subsidies
Scenario  : SMCP
Scenario 3     Increased 
tolls + transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 4      
"Pure" SMCP
Scenario 5            
Pure SMCP + transport 
fund + public subsidies
Scenario 2   Usual tolls 
+ transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 1 : Usual 
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10% -75% -75%
73 701 71 621 100 182 100 182
0% 17 458
73 701
















Public subsidies (€/day )
Central goverment revenues (€/day)
 Highway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of highway operator GOS*
 Motorway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of motorway operator GOS *
Global welfare variation*
Low income welfare variation*
High income welfare variation*
AFITF subsidies (€/day)
*In reference with scenario 1







Scenario  : Usual 
tolling scheme + 
public subsidies
Scenario  : Tolls + transport fund 
(AFITF) + public subsidies
1 506 132 476
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Toll** on motorway Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
Passenger toll  0.90 0.77 0.90 0.77
Passenger toll variation* -36% -45% -36% -45%
Freight toll  0.45 0.39 0.45 0.39
Toll freight variation* -24% -34% -24% -34%
Demand on motorway
Passengers demand variation*
 Freight demand variation*
Toll** on highway
Passenger toll  2.40 0.74 2.40 0.74
Freight toll  1.102 0.369 1.102 0.369
Demand on highway
Passengers demand variation*
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Scenario 3     Increased 
tolls + transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 4     
"Pure" SMCP
Scenario 5            
Pure SMCP + transport 
fund + public subsidies
Scenario 2   Usual tolls 
+ transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 1 : Usual 
tolling scheme + 
public subsidies
A 585 project





Scenario  : Tolls + transport fund 
(AFITF) + public subsidies






Public subsidies (€/day )
Central goverment revenues (€/day)
 Highway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of highway operator GOS*
 Motorway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of motorway operator GOS *
Global welfare variation*
Low income welfare variation*
High income welfare variation*
AFITF subsidies (€/day)
*in reference with scenario 1






Scenario  : Usual 
tolling scheme + 
public subsidies
Scenario  : Tolls + transport fund 
(AFITF) + public subsidies
-11 465
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Toll** on motorway Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
Passenger toll  3.75 1.13 3.75 1.13
Passenger toll variation* 41% -58% 41% -58%
Freight toll  1.98 0.82 1.98 0.82
Toll freight variation* 75% -28% 75% -28%
Demand on motorway
Passengers demand variation*
 Freight demand variation*
Toll** on highway
Passenger toll  6.15 1.17 6.15 1.17
Freight toll  3.136 0.935 3.136 0.935
Demand on highway
Passengers demand variation*
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Scenario 3     Increased 
tolls + transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 4      
"Pure" SMCP
Scenario 5           
Pure SMCP + transport 
fund + public subsidies
Scenario 2   Usual tolls 
+ transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 1 : Usual 
tolling scheme + 
public subsidies
A 831 project





Scenario : Tolls + transport fund 
(AFITF) + public subsidies





Public subsidies (€/day )
Central goverment revenues (€/day)
 Highway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of highway operator GOS*
 Motorway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of motorway operator GOS *
Global welfare variation*
Low income welfare variation*
High income welfare variation*
AFITF subsidies (€/day)
* in reference with scenario 1






Scenario : Usual 
tolling scheme + 
public subsidies
Scenario  : Tolls + transport fund 
(AFITF) + public subsidies
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Toll** on motorway Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
Passenger toll  2.68 0.98 2.68 0.98
Passenger toll variation* 46% -47% 46% -47%
Freight toll  1.41 0.65 1.41 0.65
Toll freight variation* 61% -25% 61% -25%
Demand on motorway
Passengers demand variation*
 Freight demand variation*
Toll** on highway
Passenger toll  6.41 1.13 6.41 1.13
Freight toll  3.217 0.884 3.217 0.884
Demand on highway
Passengers demand variation*










0% 2% -34% -34%
57 511 57 511 50 697 50 391 50 697
74 963
-19% -19%

















Scenario 3     Increased 
tolls + transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 4      
"Pure" SMCP
Scenario 5           
Pure SMCP + transport 
fund + public subsidies
Scenario 2   Usual tolls 
+ transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 1 : Usual 








Scenarios : Tolls + transport fund 








Public subsidies (€/day )
Central goverment revenues 
(€/day)
 Highway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of highway operator GOS*
 Motorway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of motorway operator GOS 
*
Global welfare variation*
Low income welfare variation*
High income welfare variation*
AFITF subsidies (€/day)
* in référence with scenario 1
* toll per passenger or ton per trip
94 684 94 684 94 684
0.48% 0.46%
4 628 532





1 604 6457.72% 6608.11%
N.C 0.00% 5.85%
66 462 66 462
N.C
87 165 87 165 92 268
0.00% -2.11%
89 632 87 784
23 170 23 170
237.92% 237.92%
-16 800 -16 800 -17 155
178 920 273 113 278 127
98 509 4 316 1 848
Scenario  : Usual tolling 
scheme + public 
subsidies
Scenarios : Tolls + 
transport fund (AFITF) + 
public subsidies
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Toll** on motorway Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
Passenger toll  5.39 1.47 5.39 1.47
Passenger toll variation* 23% -66% 23% -66%
Freight toll  2.95 1.22 2.95 1.22
Toll freight variation* -5% -61% -5% -61%
Demand on motorway
Passengers demand variation*
 Freight demand variation*
Toll** on highway
Passenger toll  9.43 1.46 9.43 1.46
Freight toll  4.842 1.318 4.842 1.318
Demand on highway
Passengers demand variation*









Scenarios : Tolls + transport fund 
(AFITF) + public subsidies
Scenarios : SMCP
Scenario 3     Increased 
tolls + transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 4      
"Pure" SMCP
Scenario 5            
Pure SMCP + transport 
fund + public subsidies
Scenario 2   Usual tolls 
+ transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 1 : Usual 
















0% 2% -40% -40% 9 753
20 053 19 969 24 696 24 696
12 444
20 053

















Public subsidies (€/day )
Central goverment revenues (€/day)
 Highway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of highway operator GOS*
 Motorway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of motorway operator GOS *
Global welfare variation*
Low income welfare variation*
High income welfare variation*
AFITF subsidies (€/day)
* in reference with scenario 1
* toll per passenger or ton per trip
24356 24 356 24 356
-0.89% -1.38%
2 350 616





-4 176 528 -0.64% -0.64%
N.C 0.00% 2.81%
47 998 47 998
N.C
78 792 78 792 81 007
0.00% -1.84%
65 041 43 365
17 043 17 043
346.68% 346.68%
-6 909 -6 909 -7 036
143 055 167 414 169 446
26 153 1 794 21 676
Scenario  : Usual tolling 
scheme + public 
subsidies
Scenarios : Tolls + transport 
fund (AFITF) + public 
subsidies
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Toll** on motorway Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
Passenger toll  1.27 0.72 1.27 0.72
Passenger toll variation* 3% -42% 3% -42%
Freight toll  0.57 0.32 0.57 0.32
Toll freight variation* -8% -48% -8% -48%
Demand on motorway
Passengers demand variation*
 Freight demand variation*
Toll** on highway
Passenger toll  2.60 0.73 2.60 0.73
Freight toll  1.184 0.358 1.184 0.358
Demand on highway
Passengers demand variation*









Scenarios : Tolls + transport fund 
(AFITF) + public subsidies
Scenarios : SMCP
Scenario 3     Increased 
tolls + transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 4      
"Pure" SMCP
Scenario 5            
Pure SMCP + transport 
fund + public subsidies
Scenario 2   Usual tolls 
+ transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 1 : Usual 















0% 3% -55% -55% 28 215
2% -36% -36%
72 162 71 745 87 271 87 271
0% 14 104
72 162














Public subsidies (€/day )
Central goverment revenues 
(€/day)
 Highway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of highway operator 
GOS*
 Motorway operator GOS 
(€/day)
Variation of motorway operator 
GOS *
Global welfare variation*
Low income welfare variation*
High income welfare variation*
AFITF subsidies (€/day)
*in reference with scenario 1
*toll per passenger or ton per trip
Scenario  : Usual 
tolling scheme + 
public subsidies
Scenarios : Tolls + transport 
fund (AFITF) + public 
subsidies
Scenarios : SMCP
43 826 1 898 15 883
38 319 80 247 82 111
-17 315 -17 315 -17 856
0.00% -3.13%
27 083 11 200
4 670 4 670
126.97% 126.97%
41 069 41 069 43 217 22 414 22 414
N.C
N.C 0.00% 5.23%





1 632 820 1.41% 1.48% 0.84% 0.31%
1 608 794
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Toll** on motorway Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
Passenger toll  1.20 1.00 1.20 1.00
Passenger toll variation* -33% -44% -33% -44%
Freight toll  0.77 0.68 0.77 0.68
Toll freight variation* -10% -21% -10% -21%
Demand on motorway
Passengers demand variation*
 Freight demand variation*
Toll** on highway
Passenger toll  5.34 1.06 5.34 1.06
Freight toll  2.679 0.786 2.679 0.786
Demand on highway
Passengers demand variation*













50 520 50 520 45 666 45 272 45 666
11 352
262 086 262 086 261 322 296 622 296 622
0%














Scenario 3     Increased 
tolls + transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 4      
"Pure" SMCP
Scenario 4            
Pure SMCP + transport 
fund + public subsidies
Scenario 2   Usual tolls 
+ transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 1 : Usual 
tolling scheme + 
public subsidies
A 45 project





Scenarios : Tolls + transport fund 
(AFITF) + public subsidies




Public subsidies (€/day )
Central goverment revenues (€/day)
 Highway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of highway operator GOS*
 Motorway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of motorway operator GOS *
Global welfare variation*
Low income welfare variation*
High income welfare variation*
AFITF subsidies (€/day)
* in reference with scenario 1
* per passenger or ton per trip
Scenario  : 
Usual tolling 
scheme + public 
subsidies
Scenarios : Tolls + transport fund 
(AFITF) + public subsidies
Scenarios : SMCP
175 562 7 897 -115 694
593 293 760 958 769 697
-115 500 -115 500 -117 099
0.00% -1.38%
201 038 316 732
124 934 124 934
208.17% 208.17%
93 241 93 241 101 651 76 104 76 104
N.C
N.C 0.00% 9.02%





15 602 710 0.59% 0.62% 0.32% 0.73%
15 548 164
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Toll** on motorway Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
Passenger toll  12.15 1.83 12.15 1.83
Passenger toll variation* 143% -63% 143% -63%
Freight toll  6.22 1.66 6.22 1.66
Toll freight variation* 115% -42% 115% -42%
Demand on motorway
Passengers demand variation*
 Freight demand variation*
Toll** on highway
Passenger toll  10.35 1.73 10.35 1.73
Freight toll  5.488 1.680 5.488 1.680
Demand on highway
Passengers demand variation*









Scenarios : Tolls + transport fund 
(AFITF) + public subsidies
Scenarios : SMCP
Scenario 3     Increased 
tolls + transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 4      
"Pure" SMCP
Scenario 5            
Pure SMCP + transport 
fund + public subsidies
Scenario 2   Usual tolls 
+ transport fund + 
public subsidies
Scenario 1 : Usual 
















8 944 -19% -19%
32 665 32 520 38 640 38 640
0%
32 665
18 299 18 299 16 426 16 343 16 426












Public subsidies (€/day )
Central goverment revenues (€/day)
 Highway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of highway operator GOS*
 Motorway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of motorway operator GOS *
Global welfare variation*
Low income welfare variation*
High income welfare variation*
AFITF subsidies (€/day)
*with reference to scenario 1
** toll per passenger or ton per trip
Scenario  : Usual 
tolling scheme + 
public subsidies
Scenarios : Tolls + 
transport fund (AFITF) + 
public subsidies
Scenarios : SMCP
87 154 3 820 -11 336
209 240 292 574 296 639
-10 918 -10 918 -11 169
0.00% -2.30%
102 169 113 505
35 421 35 421
424.43% 424.43%
87 013 87 013 91 286 66 747 66 747
N.C
N.C 0.00% 4.91%





5 333 919 0.86% 0.90% 0.46% 0.58%
5 283 016








Low High L H L H H L H L H
Passengers demand variation* 253 515 2 915 5 917 7.9% 10.7% 16.4% 14.5% 25.3% 57.4% 51.0%
Local Transit L T L T T L T L T





Low High L H L H H L H L H
Passengers demand variation* 387 785 4 446 9 027 -5% -7% -13% -10% -18% -34% -37%
Local Transit L T L T T L T L T




Scenario 1 : current 
tolling scheme + public 
subsidies
Scenario 2 : Increase of 
toll of 25% + transport 
fund + public subsidies
Scenario 3 : Increase of toll 























































Public subsidies (€/day )
Central goverment revenues 
(€/day)
 Rail operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of rail operator GOS*
 Rail infrastructure manager 
GOS (€/day)
Variation of rail infrastructure 
manager GOS*
 Motorway operator GOS 
(€/day)
Variation of motorway operator 
GOS *
Global welfare variation 
according to the "initial" 
welfare
Low income welfare variation*
High income welfare variation*





Scenario 1 : current 














Scenario 3 : Increase of toll 










939 913 1 116 392 
-
0 188 796
Scenario 2 : Increase of 
toll of 25% + transport 















Low High L H L H H L H L H
Passengers demand variation* 253 515 2 915 5 917 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.9% 10.7% 18% 16.40%
Local Transit L T L T T L T L T





Low High L H L H H L H L H
Passengers demand variation* 387 785 4 446 9 027 0% 0% 0% -5% -7% -11% -13%
Local Transit L T L T T L T L T
 Freight demand variation* 833 208 40 809 10 202 0% 0% 0% -12% -13% -14% -15%
Global passenger demand
Global freight demand
24 245 0% -1%


























Scenario 1 : Current 
tolling scheme + public 
subsidies
Scenario 4 : Current tolling 
+national transport fund
Scenario5 : Road toll markups 
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Public subsidies (€/day )
Central goverment revenues (€/day)
 Rail operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of rail operator GOS*
 Rail infrastructure manager GOS 
(€/day)
Variation of rail infrastructure manager 
GOS*
 Motorway operator GOS (€/day)
Variation of motorway operator GOS *
Global welfare variation according to the 
"initial" welfare
Low income welfare variation*




-140 062 608 1% 1%
1 369 296 1 369 296
6 316 471 14.3% 15.8%
14 305 136 4.2%
1 874 674 1 874 674 1 874 674
- 0.00% 0.00%
939 913 939 913  1 116 392 
- 0.00% 18.78%
743 757 743 757 880 270
- 0.00% 18.35%
00
999 582 2 368 878 2 544 225
Scenario 1 : Current 
tolling scheme + public 
subsidies
1 369 296
Scenario 4 : Current tolling 
+national transport fund
Scenario5 : Road toll markups 
of 25% +  national transport 
fund
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